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Occupational choice is a significant input into individuals’ health investments, operating in a manner
that can be either health-promoting or health-depreciating.  Recent studies have highlighted the potential
importance of initial occupational choice on subsequent outcomes pertaining to morbidity.  This study
is the first to assess the existence and strength of a causal relationship between initial occupational
choice at labor entry and subsequent health behaviors and habits.  We utilize the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics to analyze the effect of first occupation, as identified by industry category and blue collar
work, on subsequent health outcomes relating to body mass index, obesity, alcohol consumption, and
physical activity in 1999-2005.  Our findings suggest that initial occupations described as craft, operative,
and service are related to higher body mass index and obesity later in life, while labor occupations
are related to higher probabilities of smoking later in life.  Blue collar work early in life is associated
with increased probabilities of obesity and smoking, and decreased physical activity later in life, although
effects may be masked by unobserved heterogeneity.  Few effects are found for the effect of initial
occupation on alcohol consumption.  The weight of the evidence bearing from various methodologies,
which account for non-random unobserved selection, indicates that at least part of this effect is consistent
with a causal interpretation.  These estimates also underscore the potential durable impact of early
labor market experiences on later health.
Inas Rashad Kelly
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  Working is an activity that occupies much of many individuals’ lives.  According to the 
2005 American Time Use Survey, employed individuals spend an average of 7.5 hours a day 
working.  A sizeable economics literature has established that early labor market history, 
including occupational choice, influences job mobility and income trajectories (Oreopoulos and 
von Wachter 2006; Light 2005).  Economic resources have, in turn, been shown to affect health 
outcomes (Smith 1999). The presence of a compensating wage differential, wherein individuals 
routinely trade off job safety and higher wages, and the presence of substantial heterogeneity in 
health care access across occupation and industry classes, further implicate occupational choice 
as a significant input into health investments.
1  
This interplay of various reinforcing and competing mechanisms suggests that work-life 
can be both health-promoting and also health-depreciating.  Moreover, it may impact health 
investments and health outcomes directly, for instance through occupational hazards or job 
strain, as well as indirectly, through health care coverage, income, and peer influences. Given 
these numerous plausible pathways, a number of studies have examined the association between 
job conditions and health (Case and Deaton 2005; Theorell 2000), though most have been 
limited by potential selection bias and are unable to draw stronger conclusions regarding 
causality.  Using the Health and Retirement Survey, Gueorguieva et al. (2009) conduct a more 
careful analysis and uncover significant gaps in baseline health by occupation that persist over 
time. 
Most of the extant literature has also focused on contemporaneous effects rather than the 
cumulative durable impact of early labor market choices.  This is surprising given that the 
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economic paradigm, which views health as a capital stock determined by lifetime investments, 
choices, and constraints (Grossman 1972), imparts a significant role to early investments and 
resources.  Furthermore, the impact of economic resources and other choices may be most acute 
during childhood or early adulthood, when health levels and pathways are being established.  
The importance of a lifetime budget constraint implies that additional economic resources may 
not have a quantitatively large impact on the current health capital stock, especially as the 
individual gets older (Smith 1999).  Even if health behaviors or health utilization respond to 
current changes in circumstances, effects on health capital may not be realized until later in the 
working life-course, suggesting that the cumulative or durable impact of labor market choices 
may be more salient than contemporaneous effects. 
 A budding literature and, in particular, three seminal studies (Fletcher and Sindelar 2009; 
Fletcher et al. 2009; Sindelar et al. 2007) have recently pointed to potentially important effects of 
initial occupational choice on subsequent health status, with substantial heterogeneity across 
socio-demographic groups. These analyses, however, have been limited to self-rated health and 
the incidence of heart attacks.   The reduced-form approach in these studies also obfuscates 
potential pathways and interim effects on health inputs.  We attempt to address these gaps, and in 
the process make significant contributions to the emerging focus on the importance of early 
occupational choice for subsequent health, and to the broader economics literature on the lasting 
effects of early circumstances on health and labor outcomes.   
This study is the first to assess the existence and strength of a causal relationship between 
initial occupational choice at labor entry and subsequent health behaviors and habits, such as 
smoking, drinking, physical activity, and body mass index, all of which are important proximate 
inputs into later health status.  Health habits are often established relatively early in life (Fletcher 4 
 
and Sindelar 2009) and therefore more likely to respond to early labor market choices.  The 
focus on health behaviors also underscores potential pathways through which initial labor market 
choices may eventually have lasting effects on health; the identified impact of initial occupation 
on later health outcomes (for instance, heart attacks, as studied in Sindelar et al. 2007) is more 
plausibly indicative of a causal link if effects on intermediate health behaviors and inputs are 
also evident.  We also undertake an exploratory analysis of potential mediators and pathways, 
including income trajectories, health insurance, work hours, and other factors, through which 
early occupational choice may have durable effects on subsequent health habits.  Identifying 
these pathways can be important in targeting public policy interventions that may moderate 
potentially adverse effects on health behaviors and overall health status.  
 The empirical analysis is based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a 
nationally-representative longitudinal data set that contains information on over 65,000 
individuals spanning as much as 36 years of their lives.  The PSID contains extensive 
information on pre-labor market conditions and family characteristics, as well as typically-
unobserved measures such as individuals’ risk tolerance, which allows us to account for potential 
selection bias.  We further employ a series of methodologies to disentangle causal effects, 
including a standard instrumental variables-based strategy; an innovative approach proposed by 
Altonji et al. (2005) that permits causal inference without the need for exclusion restrictions or 
other strong restrictive assumptions; and a novel approach proposed by Lewbel (2007) that 
generates internal instrumental variables in the presence of heteroscedastity.  This direct focus on 
accounting for selection bias and sorting out causality is another contribution that we make over 
much of the literature.  Understanding the interplay over the life-course among early labor 5 
 
market choices and health investments is important to the development of effective policies and 
programs to improve health at older ages.     
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II discusses potential 
mechanisms through which initial occupational choice may influence health behaviors, and also 
places our study within the context of the extant literature.  Section III describes our empirical 
strategies for accounting for potential selection bias, followed by a description of the data 
sources in Section IV.   Section V presents and discusses the estimates from our multivariate 
analyses.  Section VI concludes with some implications for public policy.  
II. ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK 
  The objective of this study is to assess the extent to which first occupation impacts 
subsequent health behaviors among older adults.  This question can be framed within the human 
capital model for the demand for health (Grossman 1972).  Grossman combines the household 
production model of consumer behavior with the theory of human capital investment to analyze 
an individual’s demand for health capital.   Individuals invest in health up to the point where the 
marginal benefit equates the supply price of health capital at each age.  The basic insight of this 
paradigm is that health is a capital stock and health behaviors and other inputs are investments in 
that stock.  For a rational utility maximizing agent with a lifetime horizon, today’s health stock 
will be a function of the entire history of health investments including current and past health 
behaviors, incomes, and health endowments.   
  Occupational choice, in general, is expected to be an input into health production and 
affect health outcomes and behaviors through a variety of channels.  Aspects of work can have 
both direct and indirect effects on health, which may be health-promoting or health-depreciating.  
Direct effects include occupational exposure to health and safety hazards, job strain and stress 6 
 
related to working conditions, and injury risks.  Often a compensating wage differential is 
present wherein the individual is trading off job safety for higher wages, particularly in unskilled 
jobs.  Thus, occupational choice is also a form of direct investment in health.
2  The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reports 4.1 non-fatal workplace injuries and illnesses 
among 100 equivalent full-time workers in 2008.
3  This national all-industry average masks 
considerable heterogeneity; the rate is much higher among larger firms and among state and local 
government employers.  Certain private industries such as crop and animal production, 
food/beverage and tobacco manufacturing, wood and primary metal manufacturing, hospitals, 
and nursing and residential care facilities also exhibit far higher rates of occupational illness and 
injury.  
Job strain associated with working conditions may also have direct adverse effects on 
mental and physical health.  In a comprehensive review of the literature on job stress, Michie and 
Williams (2003) find that long hours worked, work overload and pressure, and the effects of 
these conditions on personal lives are key factors associated with psychological ill health and 
sickness absence.  Depression and mental illness, in turn, have been found to causally impact 
participation in unhealthy behaviors such as smoking, drinking, and illicit drug use (Saffer and 
Dave 2005).    
  Indirect effects of occupational choice on health can occur via shifts in income and 
wealth constraints, health insurance coverage, shifts in time constraints, and influences through 
workplace peers.  For instance, initial occupational choices affect occupational mobility, tenure 
and experience, and income trajectories over one’s lifetime (Light 2005); these shifts in   
                                                  
2 See Cropper (1977) for a formal introduction of occupational choice in Grossman’s human capital framework for 
the demand for health capital. 
3 Industry-specific non-fatal workplace injury and illness rates are available at: http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshsum.htm. 
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economic resources would in turn be expected to impact health.  While the direction of causality 
is not well-established, a sizeable literature documents a strong association between income or 
wealth and a variety of health outcomes including mortality and morbidity (Smith 1999).  Ettner 
(1996), in an attempt to disentangle causality, applies an instrumental variables-based 
methodology to three large-scale nationally representative data sets.  She estimates the structural 
impact of income on health and concludes that increases in income significantly improve mental 
and physical health, but also increase the prevalence of alcohol consumption.    
The prevalence of uninsured individuals also varies substantially across occupation and 
industry classes, which in turn may mediate the impact of occupational choice on health.  For 
instance, among non-professional and non-managerial occupations, almost half of all non-elderly 
workers in agriculture are uninsured, 40% of such workers in construction are uninsured, and 
25% of workers in the wholesale and retail trade lack insurance.
4  Summarizing the results from 
the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, Newhouse (2004) concluded that higher coinsurance 
rates and lack of access to care reduced health care utilization, and while for “most people 
enrolled in the RAND experiment, who were typical of Americans covered by employment-
based insurance, the variation in use across the plans appeared to have minimal to no effects on 
health status … for those who were both poor and sick – people who might be found among 
those covered by Medicaid or lacking insurance – the reduction in use was harmful, on average.”  
McWilliams et al. (2007) similarly find that compared with previously insured adults, previously
 
uninsured adults reported significantly improved health trends
 after becoming eligible for 
Medicare at age 65.  Numerous studies have also shown that physician advice and interventions 
are successful in influencing patient behaviors such as smoking, drinking, exercise, and diet 
                                                  




(Dave and Kaestner 2009; U.S. Preventive Services Task Force 2004, 2003).  Subsequently, lack 
of access to primary care due to interruptions in health insurance may lead to unhealthy 
lifestyles.  Hadley (2003), in a review of the literature, likewise concludes that, while all studies 
have methodological issues, research over the past 25 years makes a compelling case that having 
health insurance and greater health care utilization would improve the health of the uninsured.   
Data from the American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) indicate that work-related physical 
activity (measured in equivalent metabolic units) varies substantially across occupations, being 
expectedly largest in mining, agriculture, construction, and manufacturing jobs, and lowest 
among management and administrative jobs.  Leisure-time physical activity also varies across 
occupations, often in inverse relation to work-related activity, suggesting some substitution 
between the two types driven by time constraints.  This heterogeneity in physical activity across 
jobs, combined with differential effects of work-related versus leisure-time physical activity, 
would be expected to impact body mass index and subsequent health status, ceteris paribus. 
As much of life is spent working, social influences through workplace peers may also 
impact individuals’ health behaviors.  Moon and Kim (2001), for instance, estimate prevalence 
of cigarette smoking by occupation and industry in the U.S., using data from the National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Survey.  They document considerable differences across occupations 
and industries.  Smoking prevalence is highest among material movers, construction laborers, 
and vehicle mechanics and repairers, and lowest among teachers.  Among industry groups, the 
construction industry had the highest prevalence of cigarette smoking.  Powell et al. (2005) 
conclude that peer effects have a significant impact on youth smoking behavior and that there is 
a strong potential for social multiplier effects.  Thus, with respect to initial occupation, health 9 
 
behaviors of young adults and youth may be especially susceptible to peer influences at the 
workplace. 
Prior Studies 
Given these plausible mechanisms, numerous social scientists have studied the empirical 
relationship between work status, job characteristics, and health.
5  For instance, the longitudinal 
Whitehall studies examine the health of civil servants in London, focusing on how occupation 
affects health (Marmot and Smith 1997; Marmot and Bobak 2000; Marmot 2001).  In general, 
these studies find that occupational status, job insecurity, and stress, among other factors, impact 
various dimensions of health, including coronary heart disease, self-reported health status, 
various morbidities, and health behaviors. 
This literature, however, has largely ignored any potential durable impact of occupational 
choice.  Three recent studies address this gap and acknowledge the importance of early 
occupational choice; these studies are the first to empirically investigate how initial occupation 
and job characteristics may have a cumulative impact on subsequent health status.  Fletcher et al. 
(2009) match job characteristics from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to individual records 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to investigate the cumulative impact of job 
characteristics on self-rated health status.  They construct five-year cumulative measures of job 
characteristics, and find that individuals working in jobs with high physical demands or harsh 
conditions experience declines in their health, with stronger adverse effects for females and older 
workers.  This is consistent with Fletcher and Sindelar (2009) who also find that a blue-collar 
occupation at labor force entry is associated with subsequent decrements in self-reported health 
status.  Sindelar et al. (2007) aggregate three-digit occupational codes into ten broad categories 
and consider the effects of early occupation choice on self-rated health status and ever having a 
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heart attack.  They also confirm that first-occupation has a durable impact on later health, though 
the impact varies by health measure and the degree of control for other observables.  
Contributions 
Our study adds to this emerging literature on the importance of early occupational choice 
on subsequent health and fits within the broader economics literature on lasting effects of early 
circumstances on health and labor outcomes. The studies noted above make a seminal 
contribution to this literature, though the focus thus far has been on self-rated health status and 
on the incidence of heart attacks.  This study investigates the impact of first occupation on a host 
of subsequent health behaviors including smoking, drinking, physical activity, and body mass 
index, all of which are important proximate inputs into health.  The focus on health behaviors is 
warranted for at least two reasons.  First, durable effects on health behaviors (that is, investments 
in health) may be relatively more apparent and easier to identify statistically in a consistent 
manner than effects on indicators of the health stock.  Second, the focus on health behaviors also 
underscores potential pathways through which initial labor market choices may eventually have 
lasting effects on health.  We also undertake a first step in directly investigating channels of 
effect, including shifts in income, hours worked, and other potential mediators through which 
initial occupational choice may influence health behaviors.  Earlier studies have generally 
implemented a reduced-form approach, which does not inform the “black box” that links early 
occupation to subsequent health.  Uncovering evidence of plausible mechanisms also adds to the 
weight of the evidence bearing on whether the link represents a causal effect. 
Furthermore, since occupational choice may be sticky over one’s lifetime, the durable 
effect of first occupation is often confounded with the contemporaneous effect of current 
occupation in the prior studies.  We are careful to distinguish between these two effects.  We also 11 
 
draw upon the other studies to address the issue of causality for comparison, but also supplement 
our analyses with other methodologies to account for non-random unobserved selection.  In 
summary, this study provides the first empirical estimates for the lasting durable impact of first 
occupation on subsequent health behaviors for the general population and across demographic 
groups, while paying careful attention to potential bias from unobserved selection, potential 
channels of effect, and potential confounding between durable and contemporaneous effects.   
III.  METHODOLOGY     
The above discussion suggests that early labor market choices can be a significant input 
into an individual’s health production function.  In general, empirically identifying the causal 
effect of occupation on health behaviors is complicated by two issues.  The first is what we refer 
to as structural endogeneity, wherein in addition to occupation affecting health outcomes and 
behaviors, the causality may also run in reverse; health, and specifically private information on 
the respondent’s health, may drive occupational choices and work decisions. Our focus on initial 
occupational choice and its impact on subsequent adult health investments bypasses this 
simultaneity concern.   The second, what we refer to as statistical endogeneity, wherein an 
individual’s early labor market choices and subsequent health investments may depend on a 
common set of unobserved factors (for instance, family history or risk tolerance), is a more 
relevant concern for this study. 
Consider the following linear specifications of the structural production function for 
health behaviors (Hit) and initial occupational choice (Oit-1):
6 
(1) Hit   = β1 Oit-1 + β2 Xi + β3 μi + εit           
(2) Oit-1   = α1 Xi + α2Zit-1 + α3μi + μit           
                                                  
6 The health-investment production function is based on Grossman (1972), extended to include occupational choice 
as an input into health investment.  The occupational choice model is based on the theory of human capital 
investment (for example, see Borjas 2004; Boskin 1974).  12 
 
Equation (1) is a production function for health behaviors (Hit) at adulthood, which is a function 
of occupational choice at labor market entry (Oit-1), observable characteristics such as age, 
gender, race, and education (Xi), and unobservable characteristics pertaining to the individual, 
such as family background, tolerance towards risk, and the rate of time preference (μi).  Equation 
(2) postulates the determinants of occupational choice at labor market entry.  The vector Zit-1 
represents observed and unobserved variables specific to the occupation decision, such as 
parental occupation, initial labor market conditions, or private information regarding expected 
costs and benefits associated with the occupational choice, which may not directly impact the 
individual’s subsequent health status (conditional on own and parental income or wealth, and 
other investments). The vector μi denotes common unobserved determinants of occupational 
choice that may also influence health.  The subscripts refer to the i
th individual in time period t, 
and t-1 denotes initial labor market entry or earlier periods.   
  Our objective is to estimate β1 in order to assess the existence and strength of a possible 
causal relationship between first occupation and health behaviors.  However, single equation 
methods applied to equation (1) may not yield causal information due to the presence of non-
random selection into different occupations and investments in health – that is, correlation 
between μi and Oit-1 (α3 ≠ 0).  Our estimation strategy proceeds in a stepwise fashion.  Initially, 
we ignore the statistical endogeneity and estimate equation (1) using a standard regression 
model.  We begin with a parsimonious set of covariates, and then estimate models with an 
expanded set of covariates including state fixed effects, family history, risk tolerance, and 
employment information, some of which are typically unobserved in other data sets.  Estimating 
both the basic and the extended models allows us to evaluate how much of the association 
between early occupational choice and later health behaviors appears to be driven by omitted 13 
 
individual heterogeneity.  If the magnitude of the marginal effect of first occupation is highly 
sensitive to the inclusion of the additional covariates and typically-unobserved factors, then it is 
likely that factors that remain unobserved also play some role in this relationship.
7  This 
assumption is reasonable if one is using a multi-purpose, secondary data set, where the 
information collected on respondents may not include all information relevant to the outcome 
under study (Altonji et al. 2005).  In cross-sectional data, which generally would not contain 
information on pre-labor entry characteristics and family history, unobserved factors are likely to 
be rather influential, whereas this may not be the case in a rich longitudinal data set such as the 
PSID, which includes measures of parental investments and family history as well as measures 
of the respondent’s tolerance towards risk.  
  We refer to this problem as selection on observables and selection on unobservables 
(Altonji et al. 2005).  We use these terms to acknowledge that respondents are not randomly 
sorted into occupations and health.  Selection on observables refers to observed factors (such as 
age, gender, and race) that are correlated with both initial occupation and subsequent health 
behaviors.  Selection on unobservables refers to possible factors that are not available in our data 
set, and will therefore influence the marginal effect of initial occupation. 
  The degree of selection on the observables can be gauged by comparing the estimated 
coefficients on first occupation from the parsimonious and extended models.  The degree of 
selection on the unobserved characteristics cannot be measured directly with non-experimental 
data.  However, we can bound this latter effect, allowing us to draw inferences regarding the 
unbiased relationship between first occupation and later health behaviors. 
                                                  
7 The direction and magnitude, however, is unknown, depending on the nature of the joint distribution of the 
observed and unobserved characteristics. 14 
 
  Thus, the next step in our empirical strategy relies on an innovative approach proposed 
by Altonji et al. (2005), comprising two parts.  The first step involves obtaining estimates of the 
effect of first occupation on health behaviors from a bivariate probit regression model in which 
the correlation between unobserved variables is fixed at various levels.  This part of the analysis 
allows us to assess how sensitive estimates of the effect of first occupation are to the potential 
problem of correlated unobservables. The second step computes the amount of sorting into first 
occupation and adult health behaviors on observed variables, and obtains estimates of the effect 
of first occupation under the assumption that the degree of sorting on unobserved variables is 
equal to the degree of sorting on observed variables.  
  Specifically, alternately defining healthy behaviors and first occupation as dichotomous 
indicators (described below), application of the bivariate probit model assumes that εi and μi are 
distributed bivariate normally with a correlation of ρ and unit variances.
8  First, we estimate a 
bivariate probit model without any identifying assumptions but with a constrained correlation 
coefficient, ρ.  We constrain ρ to be 0.10 initially and then examine the effects of increasing ρ in 
increments of 0.10 to 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 and 0.50.  Since it is also plausible that unobserved factors 
common to both blue collar work and health behaviors are negatively correlated, we then 
constrain ρ to be -0.10, increasing incrementally (in absolute value) to -0.20, then -0.30, -0.40, 
and -0.50.  In this way, we impose on the model increasingly greater amounts of correlation 
between unobservables, and examine whether or not the effect of first occupation on health 
behaviors is robust to such changes. This analysis allows one to determine the threshold of 
selection on unobservables, if any, at which first occupation no longer has a statistically 
significant effect on health behaviors. 
                                                  
8 The model is estimated using maximum likelihood (Evans and Schwab 1995; Goldman et al. 2001). 15 
 
Altonji et al. (2005) argue that if the observable determinants of an outcome are truly just 
a random subset of the complete set of determinants, selection on observable characteristics must 
be equal to selection on unobservable characteristics. This assertion of equal selection is unlikely 
to be true, and in fact, given our specialized longitudinal data set, we would expect selection on 
observable factors to be greater than selection on unobservable factors. Thus, estimates obtained 
under the assumption of equal selection are likely biased downwards, and represent a lower-
bound estimate.  The upper bound effect is the estimate from the naïve single equation extended 
model that assumes no additional selection on unobservable variables. 
The advantage of the Altonji et al. (2005) procedure is that it allows researchers to assess 
the possible existence and strength of a causal relationship without requiring the use of 
identifying assumptions that are often not credible – for example, the existence of valid 
instruments in an instrumental variables context or other ad hoc exclusion restrictions.  As a 
result, without any other identifying assumptions, researchers can estimate the degree of sorting 
on unobservable factors using the observed data, and identify a lower bound on the causal 
parameter estimate. 
  We also supplement our analyses with additional robustness checks in order to add to the 
weight of the evidence on the issue of causality.  While instrumental variables-based 
methodologies are difficult to implement in practice, owing to the challenges in identifying 
plausible exclusion restrictions, we follow Fletcher and Sindelar (2009) in using parental 
occupation (conditional on parental income and education) and early state labor market 
conditions as instrumental variables (IV) for first occupational choice.  Diagnostic tests are 
consistent with the identifying assumption that these measures have no direct impact on future 
health behaviors (outside of their impact through occupational choice), and that these measures 16 
 
are significant predictors of first occupation. These estimates should, nevertheless, be interpreted 
with caution.  This part of the analysis does, however, allow us to place our findings on health 
behaviors within the context of the sparse, but important, prior studies that have considered 
health outcomes. If these prior estimates on health outcomes are plausibly causal, then we should 
also see commensurate effects on health behaviors, which are proximate inputs into later health.  
This analysis further allows us to compare our lower and upper bound estimates derived under 
minimal identifying restrictions with those derived under a more standard IV approach. 
Lewbel (2007) presents an IV technique that is useful when valid external instruments are 
weak or not available.  This procedure relies on the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error 
term of the first-stage equation, which is tested using a Breusch-Pagan (1979) test.  The Lewbel 
IV procedure uses ሺܺെܺ തሻ כݑ ଶ ෞ  as the identifying instruments, where X is a vector of 
independent variables that may include all independent variables or a subset of them, and ݑଶ ෞ is 
the predicted residual from the first-stage (occupational choice) regression.  Therefore, we also 
implement an instrumental variables analysis where we exploit the heteroscedastic nature of the 
residuals to generate internal instruments.  As validation for this technique, we consistently find 
evidence of heteroscedasticity in our samples. 
As a final step, we implement an exploratory analysis of potential mediators to inform the 
strength of the specific mechanisms underlying the impact of first occupation on later health 
behaviors.  The estimated specifications thus far only include exogenous socioeconomic and 
predetermined factors so as not to “over-control” for factors that may be potential pathways.  In 
alternate analyses, we re-estimate specification (1) by incorporating household income, hours 
worked, and current occupational status to gauge the extent to which the estimated effect (if any) 
of first occupation on subsequent health behaviors can be explained by these mediators.  17 
 
IV. DATA 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics was begun in 1968 and covers a representative 
sample of U.S. individuals (men, women, and children) and the family units in which they reside.  
By the end of the 2003 survey, the PSID had collected information from over 65,000 individuals 
spanning as much as 36 years of their lives.  Starting in 1997, the surveys were conducted 
biennially.  Between 1968 and 1972, data collection took place through in-person interviews 
using paper and pencil questionnaires.  Thereafter, most interviews were telephone interviews or, 
starting in 1993, computer assisted telephone interviews.
9  Comprehensive information on health 
behaviors, labor market characteristics, and demographic characteristics are readily available in 
the PSID.  In our analysis, we use years 1999-2005, yet we exploit the longitudinal nature of the 
data set by thoroughly utilizing information from prior years, particularly regarding labor market 
characteristics.  Information on the head of the household and spouse are used due to the sparse 
information on health behaviors for other family members. 
Health Outcomes 
Body Mass Index:  Self-reported weight and height are available in the PSID in the 1986, and 
1999-2005 waves, for the head of the household and the wife.  The body mass index, or BMI, is 
calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in squared meters.  Other measures of 
adiposity have been shown to be superior to BMI (Burkhauser and Cawley 2008; Wada and 
Tekin 2010).  However, they tend to be costly and are not routinely measured in physical 
examinations. BMI is a nationally representative figure that provides a reliable approximation of 
weight changes over time.  Results are not sensitive to applying an adjustment procedure to 
correct for potential under-reporting of BMI based on observable characteristics, as employed in 
Chou, Grossman and Saffer (2004). 
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Obesity:  Obesity is defined by the National Institutes of Health as having a BMI of 30 kg/m2 or 
greater. According to data from the National Institutes of Health, the percentage of individuals 
18 years of age or older classified as obese has risen in the United States from 12.7% in the 
1960s to 31.7% in 2004.  Obesity carries many risks for a host of disorders, including heart 
disease, hypertension, stroke, cancer, and depression (Must et al. 1999; Mokdad et al. 2003).  A 
variety of economic causes have been explored, including reductions in job strenuousness 
(Philipson 2001; Lakdawalla and Philipson 2009), technological innovation in food processing 
and preparation (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro 2003), the growing availability of restaurants and 
the increased labor force participation of females (Chou, Grossman, and Saffer 2004; Rashad, 
Grossman, and Chou 2006), urban sprawl (Ewing et al. 2003), and time preference for the 
present (Komlos, Smith, and Bogin 2004; Smith, Bogin, and Bishai 2005; Zhang and Rashad 
2008).  
Alcohol Consumption:  For 1999-2005, the PSID asks the head of the household and their spouse 
(if any) to report on the average number of drinks consumed per day.  The responses are 
categorical (less than one a day; 1-2 drinks; 2-4 drinks; or 5 or more drinks a day), which we 
convert to the midpoints of each category (Powers and Xie 2008); we convert the “less than one 
a day” category into 0.5 drinks and the “five or more a day” category to 5.5 drinks.  Alcohol 
consumption – and particularly abuse – can have adverse effects on labor market productivity, 
morbidity, mortality, and economic growth (Cesur 2009).  Yet some studies have shown that 
moderate drinking has a positive effect on wages, largely operating through social networking 
channels (Berger and Leigh 1988; French and Zarkin 1995; Hamilton and Hamilton 1997; 
McDonald and Shields 2001; Tekin 2004; Bray 2005).  Other studies conclude that the positive 19 
 
relationship between moderate drinking and earnings mostly represents unobserved selection 
bias (Saffer and Dave 2005; Dave and Kaestner 2002). 
Smoking:  The PSID asks questions on smoking by the head of the household and the spouse in 
1986, and again in the years 1999-2005.  We construct a dichotomous indicator for current 
smoking as the outcome measure.  According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
tobacco use, which can lead to lung, larynx, esophageal, and oral cancers, is the nation's most 
preventable cause of disease, disability, and death.
10 
Physical Activity:  In 1999-2005, the PSID asks heads of households and their spouses to report 
on the frequency of light and heavy physical activity.  The questions are: “How often do you 
participate in light physical activity – such as walking, dancing, gardening, golfing, bowling, 
etc.?” and “How often do you participate in vigorous physical activity or sports – such as heavy 
housework, aerobics, running, swimming, or bicycling?”  Individuals report on their frequency 
of participation and a reference time unit, which we standardize to an average weekly frequency.  
Physical activity has been shown to be an important factor in keeping morbidity and mortality at 
bay, and most Americans do not engage in sufficient amounts of physical activity (USDHHS 
1996; Pratt et al. 1999). 
First-Occupation Variables 
In order to accurately capture information on first occupation, we defined two alternative 
measures pertaining to first occupation.  The first is based on recall and is asked in 1997-2005: 
“Thinking of your first full-time regular job, what kind of work did you do?”  Three-digit 
occupation codes from the 1970 Census of Population are provided.  From these we derived 16 
occupational categories: Craft, Operative, Transport, Labor, Farmer, Manager, Sales, Clerical, 
Craft, Operative, Transport, Labor, Farmer, Service, Private, and Professional.  A dichotomous 
                                                  
10 See http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/ for more information. 20 
 
variable is further defined as equal to 1 if the category is one of Craft, Operative, Transport, 
Labor, or Farmer, and 0 otherwise, denoted as “blue-collar” occupation.  We use the most recent 
recall (1997) prior to 1999, as well as recalls from the 2003 and 2005 surveys, which use 
occupational codes based on the 2000 Census.  
  The second measure is based on the first occupation reported by the individual in the 
PSID, starting from 1968.  This measure, by using reported information at the time of first 
occupation, minimizes potential recall bias.  Since only one-digit occupation codes were initially 
coded, we created the following 8 occupational categories based on these one-digit codes: Craft, 
Operative, Labor, Farmer, Manager, Self-Business, Clerical, and Professional.  A dichotomous 
indicator representing blue-collar work is further defined to reflect the following occupations: 
Craft, Operative, Labor, or Farmer.  Models also control for years since first occupation, defined 
as the difference between the current survey year and the year of first-reported occupation, to 
capture the effect of time duration since initial labor-market entry. 
Individual Characteristics 
All models control for individual characteristics pertaining to gender, race/ethnicity, 
education, age, marital status, and employment status.
11  Alternate models also control for 
parental characteristics including the educational status of the mother and father and whether the 
family was poor.
12   
A module probing the individual’s tolerance towards risk is administered to a subset of 
individuals in 1996.  Measures of risk aversion are obtained from a series of questions involving 
                                                  
11 In our initial specifications, we do not control for mediating factors such as household income and hours worked, 
which may represent mechanisms through which initial occupation affects health behaviors. Models reported in 
Table 11 assess the importance of these mediators.    
12 Parental education is categorical: (1) grades 0-5, (2) grades 6-8, (3) grades 9-11, (4) grade 12, (5) 12 grades + 
non-academic training; R.N., (6) some college, no degree; associate’s degree, (7) college baccalaureate degree and 
no advanced degree mentioned; normal school; RN with 3 years of college, and (8) college, advanced or 
professional degree; some graduate work. 
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the willingness to choose different levels of lifetime income with varying probabilities.  The 
module has undergone considerable testing in order to minimize misunderstandings and 
additional complications in interpretation, and to ensure consistency with the economist’s 
concept of risk preference.  Barsky et al. (1997) provide a detailed analysis of the survey 
instrument.  Answers to the questionnaire separate the individuals into four distinct categories of 
risk preference, ranging from the most risk tolerant to the most risk averse.
13  Almost half 
(48.6%) of the respondents can be classified in the most risk-averse category, with 31.8 percent 
divided equally among the second and third most risk-averse groups , and 19.6 percent 
comprising the least risk-averse categories.  Barsky et al. (1997) validate such a module of risk 
tolerance from the Health and Retirement study, and show that it is related to behaviors 
(insurance, portfolio allocation, migration, risky health behaviors, self-employment) that would 
be expected to vary with an individual’s propensity to take risks.  Since the PSID respondents 
only partake in the risk module once, the measure of risk tolerance is time-invariant.  This is not, 
however, a concern, since studies have shown that personality traits associated with risk 
tolerance are generally stable, have a biogenic basis, and have some constancy across various 
situations (Howard et al., 1997; Menza et al., 1991).  Individuals’ propensity for risk-taking is 
typically unobserved in other datasets, and represents an important source of non-random 
selection into outcomes, since it may affect both occupational choice as well as participation in 
other risky and unhealthy behaviors.  We include measures of risk-tolerance in supplemental 
analyses and extended models to address this potential selection bias. 
Instrumental Variables 
                                                  
13 The categories can be ranked in order, without any functional form restrictions on the preference parameters or the 
utility function.   22 
 
In the instrumental variables (IV) models based on external instruments, we use 
information on the county unemployment rate in 1968 (the earliest year county unemployment is 
reported) when the average respondent is 18 years of age, and whether the respondent’s father 
worked in a blue-collar occupation.   Similar instruments (early labor market conditions and 
parental occupation) were also utilized by Fletcher and Sindelar (2009).  We confirm that these 
measures are significant predictors of whether the respondent’s first occupation was blue-collar 
in the expected direction.  Higher county unemployment rates in the initial wave raise the 
probability of blue-collar work;  similarly, a respondent is also more likely to work in a blue-
collar occupation if their father did so as well.  Conditional on parental education and family 
resources, these variables do not have any direct effects on health behaviors as evidenced by the 
test of overidentification restrictions.  Alternately, these instrumental variables are also 
insignificant with close-to-zero magnitudes when included in the extended specifications, again 
suggesting that they do not directly impact health behaviors.  However, the instruments lack 
statistical power and the estimates should therefore be interpreted with caution.  This underscores 
the difficulties of implementing a conventional IV-based strategy, particularly when analyzing 
the effects of early circumstances, since first occupation (at least 30 years prior to current adult 
outcomes) is difficult to predict with strong statistical power and in a way that is uncorrelated 
with subsequent inputs into health.  Thus, alternate approaches with a series of checks add to the 
weight of the evidence bearing upon the research question. 
  Out of approximately 11,000 individuals who were either head of household or spouse in 
years 1999-2005, sample sizes after deleting missing information on the aforementioned 





  Table 1 indicates that the largest fraction of workers first commence their labor market 
experience in the Clerical occupational category (approximately 22%), followed by Professional 
occupations (~17%).  Approximately 36% of respondents were initially blue collar workers 
based on recall in 1999 or 2005, and approximately 38% were initially blue collar workers based 
on their first reported occupation in the earliest PSID wave.  There are significant differences in 
health behaviors between individuals whose initial labor market entry was in blue-collar 
occupations relative to non-blue collar occupations.  In general, initial blue-collar workers tend 
to engage in more unhealthy behaviors; they have a higher BMI and are more likely to be obese, 
have higher daily alcohol consumption, and are more likely to be current smokers.  However, 
initial blue-collar workers are also more physically active.  These differences are persistent in 
both 1999 and 2005. 
  While these differences in health behaviors are suggestive, individuals are not randomly 
selected into initial blue-collar occupations.  There are also significant differences with respect to 
other observable characteristics between blue-collar and non-blue collar workers.  For instance, 
initial blue-collar workers are more likely to be male, low-educated, slightly older, married, and 
have low-educated and poor parents.  Thus, the association between first occupation and 
subsequent unhealthy behaviors also reflects confounding due to such non-random selection on 
observables and potential selection on unobservables.  The multivariate analyses address these 
concerns.  
  Tables 2a and 2b present estimates of the impact of first occupation on BMI in 1999 and 
2005, respectively.  Estimates are generally robust across the alternate measures of first 24 
 
occupation, whether based on recall in 1999/2005 or generated based on the respondent’s first 
reported occupation in the earliest wave.  In the limited specification (model 1), when broken 
down by occupational category, the Craft, Operative, Transport, Labor, Farmer, Sales, Clerical, 
Service, and Private occupations are significantly and positively associated with BMI (0.5 – 1.9 
points higher), relative to initial Professional occupation.  Aggregating occupations in 
specifications 3 and 6 suggests that initial blue-collar work is associated with a 0.4 to 0.7 point 
increase in BMI.
14  The extended specifications control for state indicators, which capture all 
time-invariant state-specific factors, maternal and paternal education, parental poverty status, and 
indicators of risk tolerance – measures which are typically unobserved in other datasets.
15  The 
magnitude of the impact of initial blue-collar occupation is fairly robust to these additional 
controls, suggesting a 0.1 – 0.6 point increase in BMI in 1999; the precision of these estimates is 
reduced in the extended models due to reduced sample size.  This compares to a 1.4 point 
increase in BMI, among blue-collar workers, based on the unadjusted means reported in Table 1.  
About 50 to 60% of this unadjusted difference is driven by observable factors such as age, race, 
education, marital status, and gender.  The robustness in the magnitude of the effect between the 
limited and extended models suggests that once the basic observables are taken into account, 
additional section on other factors may not be significant. 
  Models 5 and 8 control for prior BMI, as measured from the 1986 PSID wave.  Prior 
BMI is a strong determinant of current BMI, consistent with the substantial persistence in BMI 
over time.  The effect of initial blue-collar occupation on 1999 BMI decreases in magnitude and 
                                                  
14 The effects of the other covariates are consistent with the literature on obesity; BMI is higher among individuals 
who are black (relative to all other races), low-educated, and never-married, and individuals whose parents are low-
educated.  The BMI-age profile is concave, generally increasing up to ages 50-55 and then declining due to a loss in 
muscle mass.  
15 The coefficients on the indicators of risk tolerance (least risk-averse being the reference category) suggest that 
more risk-averse individuals have lower BMI. 25 
 
becomes insignificant.  This is consistent with initial occupation having a lasting, but 
diminishing, effect on health behaviors over time. 
  The effects of first occupation on BMI in 2005, approximately 26 years on average after 
initial labor market entry, are generally consistent with the effects in 1999 noted above.  Initial 
blue-collar occupation is associated with between a 0.3 to 1.0 point increase in BMI in 2005.  
Effect magnitudes are robust across the limited and extended specifications, and diminished 
when models control for prior BMI. 
  Tables 3a and 3b present models for obesity.  Consistent with the estimates for BMI, 
initial blue-collar occupation is associated with a 3.4 to 6.7 percentage points increase in the 
probability of being obese in 1999.  The unadjusted difference in means between blue-collar and 
non-blue collar workers was about 6 percentage points, again suggesting that as much as 50% of 
the observed difference is due to confounding.  However, additional control for parental history, 
risk tolerance, and state fixed effects do not further diminish the impact of first-occupation.  
Results for 2005 show similar patterns with somewhat higher effect magnitudes; initial blue-
collar work is associated with a 4.8 to 9.4 percentage points increase in obesity prevalence.  
Note, however, that obesity prevalence was in general higher in 2005 (24%) relative to 1999 
(19%), as shown in Table 1.  Thus, relative to these means, the effect magnitudes are consistent 
between both waves. 
  Tables 4a and 4b present models for daily alcohol consumption.  There are generally no 
consistent or significant effects of initial occupation on drinking in 1999 or 2005.  Other 
covariates affect alcohol consumption as expected and noted in the literature (Dave and Saffer 
2008).  Notably, a higher degree of risk aversion is associated with lower levels of drinking. 26 
 
  Table 5a and 5b present estimates of the impact of first-occupation on the propensity of 
being a current smoker.  There is limited evidence in 1999 that initial blue-collar work is 
associated with a higher probability of being a current smoker (by between 1.5 to 3.6 percentage 
points), though the estimates based on recalled first-occupation are imprecise.  Note that these 
estimates mask considerable heterogeneity across disaggregated occupational categories.  For 
instance, initial work in Labor is associated with a 5.5 to 7.3 percentage points increase in 
smoking prevalence, relative to Professional workers.  Based on the simple means, smoking 
prevalence among initial blue-collar workers is about 9 percentage points higher relative to non-
blue-collar workers.  Selection on observables therefore accounts for about 60-80% of the 
unadjusted difference, though as with BMI and obesity additional controls do not lead to 
substantial diminution of the effect magnitudes.  For 2005, we do not find any significant or 
substantial associations between initial blue-collar work and current smoking status.  This may 
reflect increased smoking cessation (decrease in current smoking prevalence) among all groups.  
Table 1 shows that current smoking prevalence declined from 24.9% in 1999 to 20.7% in 2005 
among individuals whose initial occupation was blue-collar; this is a larger increase than that 
experienced by individuals whose initial occupation was not blue-collar. Thus, there is some 
convergence in smoking rates between these two groups over time, which may explain why no 
significant effects are found in 2005.   
  Tables 6a and 6b present models for physical activity.  In 1999, initial blue-collar 
workers have a higher frequency of weekly physical activity by about 1-1.5 times, relative to 
those whose first-occupation was not blue-collar.  This is about 50% of the unadjusted difference 
based on the reported means in Table 1.  The effect is eroded in 2005; this is again consistent 
with the age trajectory in physical activity between initial blue-collar workers and non-blue 27 
 
collar workers.  While initial blue-collar workers are more physically active than the others, the 
difference tends to diminish over time.   
  To summarize, single-equation estimates suggest three points.  First, there is some 
evidence that initial blue-collar work has some lasting effects on health behaviors; specifically, it 
is associated with higher BMI and obesity and with a higher prevalence of being a current 
smoker.  It is also associated with a higher frequency of physical activity.  Second, while there 
may be lasting effects of initial occupational choice, these effects tend to diminish over the life 
cycle as might be expected.  Third, selection on observed factors account for about 50-80% of 
the unadjusted difference in health behaviors between the groups of workers; however, the effect 
magnitudes are not sensitive to additional controls for risk-tolerance, parental income and 
education, and state indicators.  Thus, it is likely that additional selection on unobservables in the 
same direction may also not lead to substantial diminution of the effect magnitudes.  The 
constrained bivariate probit models presented next gauge the sensitivity of the estimates to 
additional selection on unobservables. 
Constrained Selection Models 
  Table 7a presents estimates of the impact of initial blue-collar occupation on obesity, 
based on constrained bivariate probit models.  Model 1, which constrains the correlation between 
the error terms (ρ) in the obesity and first-occupation equations to 0, corresponds to single-
equation probit estimates.  Consistent with the earlier models, initial blue-collar work raises the 
probability of being obese in 1999 and 2005.  Models 2-6 impose increasing amounts of positive 
selection on unobservables, based on increments to ρ of 0.1. Even small amounts of positive 
selection (for instance, ρ=0.1) are enough to wipe out any significant positive effects of initial 
blue-collar work on the probability of being obese.  Models 7-11 impose increasing amounts of 28 
 
negative selection on unobservables.  These estimates answer the following question: What is the 
impact of initial blue-collar work on obesity if unobservable factors affecting initial blue-collar 
work and obesity are negatively correlated – that is, if there are unobservables which increase the 
likelihood of blue-collar work but reduce the likelihood of being obese?  Even the smallest 
amounts of negative selection lead to large positive and significant effects of blue-collar entry on 
obesity.   
Selection effects theoretically can be either negative or positive.  For instance, individuals 
with a high rate of time preference (more present oriented) may be more likely to enter blue-
collar occupations and also less likely to invest in their health leading to higher obesity; this 
would lead to positive selection bias.  On the other hand, individuals with a taste for physical 
activity and manual labor may also be more likely to enter blue-collar occupations but would be 
less likely to be obese; this would lead to negative selection bias.  Altonji et al. (2005) note that 
selection on observable factors can be helpful in assessing selection on unobservable factors.  
Model 12 presents estimates based on the assumption that selection on unobservables is equal to 
the selection on observables; this assumption is appropriate in general datasets where the factors 
that we observe are a random subset of all determinants of the outcome.  For the PSID, which is 
a specialized longitudinal dataset with extensive information on labor market history and other 
individual and family characteristics, the equal selection rule is likely to overestimate the amount 
of selection on unobservable factors.  This is consistent with our earlier estimates, which showed 
that adding richer covariates to the specification do not lead to substantial changes in effect 
magnitudes.  Estimates from model 12 suggest that there is positive selection on observables 
(ρ>0 in all models), and if there is an equal additional amount of selection on unobservables, 
then initial blue-collar occupation has a negative impact on obesity.  Thus, if the estimates from 29 
 
the single-equation extended models represent upper bound estimates, then the estimates from 
the models based on the equal selection constraint represent lower bound estimates.   
Table 7b presents similar estimates for current smoking status.  As before, single-
equation probit estimates (ρ=0) suggest that initial blue-collar occupation generally raises the 
probability of being a current smoker.  Similar to the models for obesity, these estimates are 
sensitive to even small amounts of additional selection on unobservable factors.  The estimates 
from the equal selection constraint (model 12) suggest that selection may be positive or negative 
depending on the time period. 
To summarize, constrained selection models allow us to assess the sensitivity of the 
estimates to additional amounts of selection on unobservable factors.  For both obesity and 
smoking, we find that even small amounts of additional selection on unobserved factors can wipe 
out the positive effects of initial blue-collar work on obesity and smoking.  Note that these 
models suggest that if there is additional selection then the estimates are wiped out.  However, it 
is not clear whether there is substantial additional selection on unobservables.  The earlier 
models do no point to additional selection on unobservables.  Thus, we also estimate 
instrumental variables models to further bear on this issue. 
Instrumental Variables 
  Table 8 presents estimates from IV models, utilizing early labor market conditions 
(county unemployment rate in the first PSID wave) and paternal blue-collar occupation as 
instruments for own first blue-collar occupation.  The tests of overidentification restrictions 
confirm that these instruments can be plausibly excluded from the structural model of health 
behaviors.  In addition, the instruments do predict own first blue-collar occupation in the 
expected direction; however, they do so weakly and therefore these results should be interpreted 30 
 
with caution.  Low statistical power is reflected in the larger standard errors and wide confidence 
intervals.  The point estimates suggest that initial first-occupation is associated with higher BMI, 
obesity, and smoking, while effects on physical activity depend on the time horizon.   
  In order to bypass the issues with weak external instruments, Table 9 presents estimates 
based on internal instruments as proposed in Lewbel (2007).  These IVs have stronger predictive 
power and are also plausibly excludable based on the tests of overidentification restrictions.  
Indeed, Lewbel (2007) recommends this methodology precisely to overcome issues with 
questionable and low-powered external instruments.  These results indicate that initial blue-collar 
occupation leads to increased BMI (1-2 points), higher probability of being obese (1.3 – 6.4 
percentage points, based on recalled first-occupation), higher probability of being a current 
smoker (2.7 – 3.5 percentage points, based on recalled first-occupation), and a higher frequency 
of physical activity in 2005 (5-7 times per week).  Some of these estimates are imprecise due to 
limited sample sizes in the extended models and, while the internal IVs are stronger, the 
statistical power of these IVs may still not be adequate.  Nevertheless, it is validating that these 
estimates are generally consistent with the estimates from the extended specifications from 
Tables 2-6. 
Heterogeneous Effects 
  The estimates thus far represent an average population effect, which may mask 
considerable heterogeneity in responses across demographic groups.  Tables 10a and 10b present 
estimates based on models stratified across socio-demographic characteristics.  These models 
suggest that initial blue-collar work has larger positive effects on alcohol consumption and 
smoking among males, relative to females.  Similarly, initial blue-collar work raises BMI and the 
probability of being obese more for Whites relative to other races; however, the increase in 31 
 
drinking and smoking is larger among non-Whites.  Initial blue-collar work is also associated 
with larger increases in physical activity among females (relative to males) and among non-
Whites (relative to whites); this is consistent with smaller increases in obesity among these 
groups.  These patterns in effects on health behaviors across gender and race groups are also 
generally consistent with reported effects on health across these groups in Fletcher and Sindelar 
(2009).  Some of these estimates are imprecise due to reduced cell sizes. 
Exploratory Analysis of Potential Mediators 
  Potential mechanisms through which initial occupational choice may impact health 
behaviors include shifts in income, hours worked, and current occupation.  Estimates in Table 11 
assess the importance of these potential mediators by alternately adding these measures to the 
baseline model and gauging the effect magnitudes.  Comparing baseline estimates to those that 
include household income and hours worked, we find that the effect magnitudes are virtually 
unchanged.
16  This suggests that the effects of first occupation on health behaviors are complex 
and may not solely operate through income effects or work intensity.  When models control for 
current occupation codes (model 4), positive effects of initial blue-collar work on obesity, 
alcohol consumption, and frequency of physical activity become somewhat stronger.  This is 
expected, and validating, since the correlation between initial blue-collar work and current blue-
collar work is not perfect.  When current occupation is not accounted, initial occupation 
confounds two groups of individuals, those who shift from blue-collar to non-blue collar over 
tine and those who do not.  If the adverse effect of initial blue-collar work on healthy behaviors 
is attenuated when individuals are no longer currently working in blue-collar jobs (which is to be 
                                                  
16 Household income is a computed variable, equal to the sum of: Taxable Income of Head and Wife, Transfer 
Income of Head and Wife, Taxable Income of Other Family Unit Members (OFUMs), Transfer Income of OFUMs, 




expected), then controlling for current occupation should make the estimated effects larger in 
magnitude.  This latter effect is evidence of a dose-response relation; the impact of initial blue-
collar occupational choice on health behaviors appears to be somewhat more pronounced if the 
individual continues in that occupation over their life.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
This study is the first to assess the existence and strength of a potential causal 
relationship between initial occupational choice at labor entry and subsequent health behaviors 
and habits.  While unadjusted differences and single-equation models do confirm that starting 
work in blue-collar occupations is subsequently associated with unhealthy behaviors (with the 
exception of physical activity) during later adulthood, one of the aims of this study was to 
examine how much of this association is consistent with a causal mechanism and how much of it 
is being driven by non-random selection.   
We utilize several methods to address this confounding: (1) controlling for a rich set of 
individual characteristics and state fixed effects; (2) estimating constrained selection models; and 
(3) estimating instrumental variables models using external and internally-generated instruments.  
We also estimate effects for outcomes in 1999 and 2005 to establish robustness as well as assess 
the durability of these effects over time.   
Estimates suggest that a substantial part of the observed difference (50-80%) is due to 
non-random selection on observable factors.  Estimates also suggest that the effect magnitudes 
are sensitive (in terms of diminution) to additional positive selection on unobservable factors;  if 
the additional selection is negative, then the estimated effect magnitudes become stronger. 
However, drawing upon the weight of the evidence from all of our various methodologies, a 
residual effect of first occupation on subsequent health behaviors remains, which is consistent 33 
 
with a causal behavioral framework.  Using years 1999 through 2005 from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, our results suggest that initial blue-collar work is associated with a higher 
body mass index and obesity later in life as well as higher probabilities of smoking later in life.  
Few effects are found for the effect of initial occupation on alcohol consumption, which is to be 
expected given that prior studies have generally found inconsistent effects between moderate 
alcohol consumption and labor market outcomes and health.   
Specifically, results from the extended and IV specifications indicate that initial labor 
entry in blue collar work raises obesity by 4 percentage points (20% relative to the baseline 
mean) and smoking prevalence by about 3 percentage points (18%).  The impact on obesity may 
explain the higher incidence of heart attacks found in Sindelar et al. (2007).  We also find 
suggestive increase in the frequency of physical activity by between 1-5 times weekly (10 – 
40%), which may be related to work-based physical activity.  Studies have found some evidence 
of a substitution effect wherein individuals who have more physically-demanding jobs are less 
likely to be physically active outside of work (Saffer et al. forthcoming).  Even if total physical 
activity is higher among manual workers, the specific composition of physical activity has 
implications for health; specifically, leisure-based physical activity is found to be health 
promoting whereas work-based physical activity, especially repetitive or factory tasks, tend to 
have little positive health effects (Saffer et al. forthcoming).   
That initial work in blue collar occupations raises the likelihood of unhealthy behaviors 
later into adulthood does not necessarily suggest that these individuals are irrational or that they 
have not considered the full costs and benefits of their occupational choice, including shifts in 
material resources, occupational hazards, and other incentives.  Indeed, the behavioral 
framework underlying the economic paradigm of investments in health capital presupposes some 34 
 
rationality.  However, if initial occupational choices are constrained based on other external 
factors (for instance, poor labor market conditions or limited choices based on educational 
attainment), then there may be room for altering these market constraints so as to improve health 
into adulthood, ceteris paribus.   
Greater public support during periods of recession and high unemployment or during 
retrenchment of specific industries may give individuals greater flexibility in their occupational 
choice.  In addition, expanding access to health care, especially among blue collar occupations,  
may also mediate the adverse effects of such occupational choice on healthy behaviors and 
health status.  Thus, future work should focus on uncovering the channels through which initial 
labor market experiences are affecting subsequent health investments.  On a broader context, the 
results from this study confirm previous findings that early labor market experiences may have 
lasting effects.  While prior studies had focused on subsequent job mobility and income 
trajectories, our study underscores the durable effects of early work-related circumstances on 
later health behaviors.      
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Table 1 







     Bluecoll=0  Bluecoll=1  Bluecoll=0  Bluecoll=1 
Outcomes
Body Mass Index  Weight in kilograms divided   26.299  25.795  27.175*** 27.134  26.597 28.086*** 
  by height in squared meters  (5.060)  (5.183)  (4.595)  (5.522)  (5.567)  (5.195) 
Obese  Dichotomous variable equal to   0.187  0.166  0.222*** 0.242  0.214 0.293*** 
  1 if BMI is ≥ 30 kg/m
2  (0.390) (0.372) (0.416) (0.428) (0.411) (0.455) 
Alcohol  Daily number of alcoholic   0.514  0.478  0.595*** 1.070  0.956 1.292*** 
  drinks  consumed  (0.743) (0.639) (0.900) (1.740) (1.536) (2.025) 
Smoke Dichotomous  variable  equal to   0.189  0.157  0.249*** 0.165  0.139 0.207*** 
  1 if respondent smokes  (0.391)  (0.364)  (0.433)  (0.371)  (0.346)  (0.406) 
Physical Activity  Weekly frequency of participation   9.823  9.154  11.177*** 9.799  9.349 10.627** 
  in light or heavy physical activity  (15.504)  (8.767)  (24.163)  (15.402)  (16.981)  (12.164) 
First Occupation Variables
Blue Collar  First Occupation Blue Collar  0.355  0.000  1.000*** 0.346 0.000  1.000*** 
 (recall)  (0.479)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.476) (0.000) (0.000) 
Blue Collar  First Occupation Blue Collar  0.377  0.232  0.632*** 0.375  0.229 0.632*** 
  (generated)  (0.485) (0.422) (0.482) (0.484) (0.420) (0.482) 
Blue Collar  First Occupation Blue Collar  0.307  0.045  0.785*** 0.299  0.043 0.781*** 
 (modified  recall)  (0.461)  (0.207) (0.411) (0.458) (0.202) (0.414) 
Craft  First Occupation:   0.106  0.000  0.300*** 0.104  0.000 0.301*** 
  Craftsman  and  Kindred  (0.308) (0.000) (0.458) (0.305) (0.000) (0.459) 
Operative  First Occupation:   0.121  0.000  0.340*** 0.115  0.000 0.333*** 
  Operatives,  except  Transport  (0.326) (0.000) (0.474) (0.320) (0.000) (0.471) 
Transport  First Occupation:   0.020  0.000  0.056*** 0.020  0.000 0.057*** 
  Transport  Equipment  Oper  (0.139) (0.000) (0.229) (0.139) (0.000) (0.232) 
Labor  First Occupation:   0.077  0.000  0.218*** 0.077  0.000 0.223*** 
  Laborers,  except  Farm  (0.267) (0.000) (0.413) (0.267) (0.000) (0.416) 
Farmer  First Occupation:   0.031  0.000  0.087*** 0.030  0.000 0.087*** 
  Farm,  Laborers,  and  Foremen  (0.173) (0.000) (0.282) (0.171) (0.000) (0.282) 
Manager First  Occupation:  Managers, 0.036  0.056  0.000*** 0.037  0.057 0.000*** 
  Administrators,  except  Farm  (0.187) (0.230) (0.000) (0.190) (0.232) (0.000) 
Sales First  Occupation:  Sales   0.068  0.106  0.000*** 0.068  0.104 0.000*** 
  Workers  (0.252) (0.308) (0.000) (0.252) (0.305) (0.000) 
Clerical First  Occupation:  Clerical and   0.219  0.340  0.000*** 0.222  0.340 0.000*** 
  Kindred  Workers  (0.414) (0.474) (0.000) (0.416) (0.474) (0.000) 
Service First  Occupation:  Service   0.140  0.217  0.000*** 0.140  0.214 0.000*** 
  Workers, except Private Househld  (0.347)  (0.412)  (0.000)  (0.347)  (0.410)  (0.000) 
Private First  Occupation:    0.008  0.012  0.000*** 0.006  0.010 0.000*** 
  Private  Household  Workers  (0.087) (0.108) (0.000) (0.080) (0.099) (0.000) 
Professional First  Occupation:  Professional,   0.173  0.268  0.000*** 0.179  0.274 0.000*** 
(reference group)  Technical, and Kindred  (0.378)  (0.443)  (0.000)  (0.384)  (0.446)  (0.000) 
Occ_Years  Years since first occupation   26.034  25.848  27.097*** 26.010  25.850 27.174*** 
  (2005)  (9.322) (9.105) (9.005) (9.198) (8.956) (8.904) 
Individual Characteristics
BMI 86  Body Mass Index in 1986  24.539  23.898  25.614*** 24.489  23.843 25.578*** 
    (4.434) (4.333) (4.375) (4.428) (4.289) (4.425) 
Obese 86  Obese Status in 1986  0.099  0.089  0.112** 0.097  0.087 0.107* 
    (0.299) (0.285) (0.315) (0.296) (0.283) (0.310) 
Male Male  Respondent  0.464  0.298  0.789*** 0.459  0.299 0.787*** 
    (0.499) (0.457) (0.408) (0.498) (0.458) (0.410) 
White  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if respondent is non-Hispanic  0.907 0.909 0.912 0.907 0.909 0.915 
  white  (0.290) (0.288) (0.284) (0.290) (0.287) (0.279) 
Black  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if respondent is non-Hispanic  0.077 0.075 0.076 0.078 0.075 0.073 
  black  (0.267) (0.263) (0.266) (0.268) (0.263) (0.261) 
Hispanic  Dichotomous variable equal to 1    0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  if respondent is Hispanic  (0.103)  (0.101)  (0.098)  (0.101)  (0.097)  (0.098) 
Other  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if respondent's race is other   0.005 0.006  0.002** 0.005  0.006 0.002** 
  than  above  (0.069) (0.077) (0.047) (0.070) (0.079) (0.044) 41 
 
Elementary Dichotomous  variable equal to   0.034  0.015  0.063*** 0.029  0.011 0.055*** 
  1 if elementary school educ  (0.182)  (0.120)  (0.242)  (0.167)  (0.105)  (0.227) 
Some High  Dichotomous variable equal to   0.105  0.068  0.162*** 0.101  0.062 0.156*** 
  1 if some high school educ  (0.307)  (0.251)  (0.369)  (0.302)  (0.242)  (0.363) 
High  Dichotomous variable equal to   0.370  0.336  0.426*** 0.364  0.331 0.420*** 
  1 if high school education  (0.483)  (0.473)  (0.495)  (0.481)  (0.471)  (0.494) 
Some College  Dichotomous variable equal to    0.224 0.232 0.218 0.228 0.235 0.230 
  1 if some college education  (0.417)  (0.422)  (0.413)  (0.420)  (0.424)  (0.421) 
College Dichotomous  variable  equal to   0.267  0.349  0.131*** 0.277  0.361 0.139*** 
  1 if college education  (0.442)  (0.477)  (0.338)  (0.448)  (0.480)  (0.346) 
Age  Age of respondent (in years)  48.997  48.274  49.907*** 54.266  53.669 55.291*** 
    (14.493) (14.207) (14.435) (13.751) (13.390) (13.920) 
Single Dichotomous  variable  equal to   0.055  0.064  0.039*** 0.048  0.055 0.031*** 
  1 if respondent is single  (0.228)  (0.245)  (0.193)  (0.213)  (0.227)  (0.174) 
Married Dichotomous  variable  equal to   0.765  0.754  0.790*** 0.752  0.747 0.776** 
  1 if respondent is married  (0.424)  (0.431)  (0.407)  (0.432)  (0.435)  (0.417) 
Widowed Dichotomous  variable  equal to   0.062  0.065  0.048*** 0.077  0.079 0.063** 
  1 if respondent is widowed  (0.241)  (0.246)  (0.213)  (0.266)  (0.270)  (0.244) 
Divorced  Dichotomous variable equal to   0.119 0.117 0.123 0.124 0.119 0.130 
  1 if respondent is divorced or 
separated  (0.323) (0.321) (0.329) (0.329) (0.324) (0.336) 
Employed  Dichotomous variable equal to    0.694 0.696 0.713 0.674 0.683 0.680 
  1 if respondent is employed  (0.461)  (0.460)  (0.452)  (0.469)  (0.465)  (0.467) 
Household Income  Household Income 74196.290  81946.790  62402.600*** 89938.880  97321.200 78835.200*** 
   (in thousands of dollars)  (85220.890)  (96964.200)  (59907.770)  (145408.400)  (126957.800)  (179404.400) 
Mother’s Educ.  Mother’s Education (Category)  3.989  4.219  3.619*** 4.026  4.261 3.634*** 
  (1=grades 0-5, .., 8=college)  (1.645)  (1.650)  (1.544)  (1.637)  (1.639)  (1.533) 
Father’s Educ  Father’s Education (Category)  3.966  4.272  3.437*** 4.009  4.315 3.461*** 
  (1=grades 0-5, .., 8=college)  (1.948)  (1.985)  (1.747)  (1.953)  (1.982)  (1.760) 
Parents Poor  Dichotomous variable equal to   0.266  0.232  0.323*** 0.259  0.225 0.318*** 
  1 if respondent answered that 
growing up, parents were poor  (0.442) (0.422) (0.468) (0.438) (0.418) (0.466) 
Instrumental Variables
County Unemp.  County Unemployment Rate in   4.046  3.944  4.204*** 4.049  3.949 4.207*** 
(1968)  1968  (2.350) (2.146) (2.613) (2.335) (2.118) (2.630) 
Father Blue Coll  Dichotomous indicator for 













(0.497)   
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.  Sample sizes are 6971 (year 1999) and 6303 (year 
2005).  Italicized occupational variables are classified as blue collar occupations.  Asterisks denote that the 
difference in means by “blue collar” (based on recall) is statistically significant at the following levels: *** p-
value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. 42 
 
Table 2a 
Impact of First Occupation on Body Mass Index, 1999 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended Limited Extended  Extended 
+ ’86 BMI 
Limited Extended  Extended 
+ ’86 BMI 
Extended 
Blue Collar      0.3514*  0.3320  0.2184  0.7330**  0.1031  -0.2509  0.5871* 
     (2.21)  (1.47)  (1.24)  (4.82)  (0.45)  (1.42)  (2.56) 
Craft  1.0970** 1.1286**               
  (4.08) (2.98)               
Operative  1.3761** 0.6962               
  (5.05) (1.62)               
Transport  1.0650* 1.4230               
  (2.14) (1.63)               
Labor  0.8677** 0.5713               
  (2.95) (1.41)               
Farmer  1.1160** 1.0974               
 (2.82)  (1.85)               
Manager 0.4618  0.7798              
 (1.27)  (1.53)               
Sales 0.7111*  0.5044             
 (2.31)  (1.13)               
Clerical 0.5038*  0.4421              
 (2.08)  (1.17)               
Service 1.5094**  0.8029*               
 (5.62)  (2.03)               
Private 1.9115*  1.0171               
 (2.39)  (0.92)               
Male  1.2255** 0.8098** 1.2209** 0.8756** -0.7834** 1.2171**  0.9801** -0.6346**  0.8216** 
  (7.86) (3.40) (8.31) (3.81) (4.01) (9.40)  (4.68) (3.53) (3.74) 
Black  2.0560** 2.0078** 2.1860** 2.0485** 1.0349** 2.1057**  2.0492** 0.9821** 2.0529** 
  (11.75) (6.65) (12.72) (6.84)  (4.31) (12.48)  (6.98)  (4.17) (6.88) 
Hispanic 1.1845  0.9038  1.2065  0.9100  -0.0186  0.8530  0.9296  -0.0461  0.9291 
  (1.74) (0.79) (1.77) (0.80) (0.02) (1.33)  (0.82) (0.04) (0.82) 
Other  -1.2469 -2.6125** -1.3731 -2.7808** -1.1715  -1.6280  -2.8751**  -1.4073*  -2.7762** 
  (1.49) (2.88) (1.60) (3.02) (1.86) (1.92)  (3.13) (2.22) (2.91) 
Some High  -1.1232*  -1.1970  -1.1393*  -1.1529  -0.9552  -1.0264*  -1.1554  -0.9726  -1.0876 
  (2.49) (1.29) (2.53) (1.22) (1.15) (2.38)  (1.23) (1.18) (1.14) 
High -1.2713**  -1.0417  -1.4080**  -1.0098  -0.6497  -1.2614**  -1.0508  -0.7646  -0.9478 
  (3.01) (1.16) (3.37) (1.11) (0.80) (3.14)  (1.16) (0.95) (1.04) 
Some College  -1.3027**  -0.4548  -1.5285**  -0.4347  -0.4869  -1.2338**  -0.4689  -0.6766  -0.3568 
  (2.95) (0.50) (3.51) (0.47) (0.59) (2.92)  (0.51) (0.83) (0.38) 
College -1.7614**  -0.7098  -2.2942**  -0.8868  -0.3108  -1.9182**  -0.9988  -0.5740  -0.8118 
  (3.94) (0.76) (5.27) (0.95) (0.37) (4.53)  (1.07) (0.69) (0.86) 
Occ_Years 0.0265*  0.0062  0.0245*  0.0068 0.0347 0.0202 0.0023  0.0361  0.0129 
  (2.40) (0.24) (2.20) (0.26) (1.46) (1.51)  (0.09) (1.55) (0.50) 
Age  0.2345** 0.2060** 0.2387**  0.2008*  -0.0651  0.2385**  0.2058**  -0.0641  0.1921* 
  (6.41) (2.61) (6.48) (2.54) (0.69) (6.30)  (2.63) (0.68) (2.45) 
Age  Squared  -0.0024** -0.0020** -0.0024** -0.0020**  -0.0001  -0.0024**  -0.0020**  -0.0001  -0.0020** 
  (7.41) (2.80) (7.50) (2.73) (0.10) (7.27)  (2.81) (0.14) (2.69) 
Married  -1.1859** -1.1686** -1.2164** -1.1403** -1.0877** -1.0838**  -0.9713*  -1.0154* -1.0527** 
  (3.90) (2.96) (4.00) (2.90) (2.71) (3.64)  (2.50) (2.54) (2.70) 
Widowed 0.0813  -0.0237  0.1633  0.0935  -1.2111*  0.3237  0.3937  -0.9875  0.1840 
  (0.18) (0.03) (0.36) (0.11) (2.13) (0.73)  (0.49) (1.75) (0.22) 
Divorced  -0.7302* -1.3838** -0.7032* -1.3298** -1.6264**  -0.6001  -1.2121** -1.5014**  -1.2865** 
  (2.09) (3.12) (2.02) (3.01) (3.73) (1.75)  (2.79) (3.46) (2.94) 
Employed -0.5186**  0.2477  -0.5269**  0.2362  -0.3484  -0.5082**  0.1742  -0.3169  0.1882 
  (2.65) (0.71) (2.68) (0.68) (1.24) (2.65)  (0.51) (1.13) (0.55) 
Mother Educ    -0.0560    -0.0562  -0.0440    -0.0474  -0.0546  -0.0430 
   (0.69)  (0.69)  (0.70)   (0.59)  (0.87)  (0.53) 
Father  Educ   -0.3183**  -0.3313**  -0.0471    -0.3438**  -0.0524  -0.3297** 
   (4.68)  (4.92)  (0.88)   (5.14)  (0.99)  (4.92) 
Parents Poor    0.1567    0.1405  -0.1675    0.1365  -0.1117  0.1059 43 
 
   (0.64)  (0.57)  (0.88)   (0.56)  (0.59)  (0.44) 













(1.83)    
Risk Averse 3 
 
 -0.4530  -0.4913  -0.2036   -0.5718  -0.2473  -0.5201 
 (1.39)  (1.51)  (0.76)   (1.78)  (0.94)  (1.60) 
Risk Averse 4    -0.5077    -0.5170*  -0.0374    -0.5648*  -0.0604  -0.5122 
 (1.92)  (1.96)  (0.17)   (2.17)  (0.28)  (1.96) 
BMI  86       0.8754**      0.8731**   
       (28.87)      (29.14)   
Constant 21.5310**  25.4000**  22.4511**  26.0759**  9.8278**  21.9274**  25.9824**  10.0515**  25.8283** 
 (22.94)  (12.52)  (24.22)  (12.82)  (4.19)  (23.59)  (12.87)  (4.31)  (12.79) 
Observations 6315  2711  6315  2711  2013  6583  2767  2050  2730 
R-squared 0.09  0.11  0.08 0.11  0.59  0.08 0.11  0.59  0.11 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.00000 0.31501 0.02718 0.14094 0.21554 0.00000  0.65067 0.15596 0.01054 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. Column 9 
uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 surveys, which 
use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation.  
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 





Impact of First Occupation on Body Mass Index, 2005 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended  Limited  Extended Extended  + 
’86 BMI 
Limited Extended  Extended 
+ ’86 BMI 
Extended 
Blue Collar      0.7518**  0.7201**  0.5927*  0.7436**  0.3084  -0.2974  1.0300** 
      (4.02) (2.70) (2.44)  (4.21)  (1.17)  (1.36)  (3.80) 
Craft  1.3503**  1.7603**             
  (4.31)  (4.07)             
Operative  1.8395**  1.3532**             
  (5.73)  (2.76)             
Transport  1.6847**  2.1138*             
  (2.84)  (2.02)             
Labor  1.4058**  1.2537**             
  (4.21)  (2.78)             
Farmer  1.1129*  1.4688*             
  (2.50)  (2.38)             
Manager  0.5226  1.0497             
  (1.20)  (1.60)             
Sales  1.0528**  0.7377             
  (2.97)  (1.54)             
Clerical  0.6910*  1.0512**             
  (2.52)  (2.62)             
Service  1.2698**  0.9291*             
  (4.13)  (2.15)             
Private  1.5847  1.0983             
  (1.36)  (0.65)             
Male 0.6385**  0.1503  0.5990**  0.1386  -1.5486**  0.7572**  0.3157  -1.2790**  0.0699 
  (3.59)  (0.53)  (3.54) (0.52) (5.98)  (5.03)  (1.28)  (5.72)  (0.27) 
Black  1.9646**  1.9268**  2.0652** 1.9645** 1.0552**  2.0458**  2.0120**  1.0417**  1.9199** 
  (9.23)  (5.49)  (9.92) (5.64) (3.37)  (10.16)  (5.85)  (3.39)  (5.56) 
Hispanic  0.9854  0.5707  1.0212 0.5988 0.3337  0.9210  0.6753  0.2840  0.6183 
  (1.39)  (0.58)  (1.46) (0.62) (0.29)  (1.38)  (0.69)  (0.25)  (0.64) 
Other -1.2674  -2.5916**  -1.4392  -2.8774**  -1.0951  -1.5498  -2.9873**  -1.4236*  -2.9063** 
  (1.07)  (3.00)  (1.20) (3.33) (1.81)  (1.37)  (3.49)  (2.32)  (3.16) 
Some  High -0.8287  -1.1292  -0.8025 -1.1150 0.6571  -0.7233  -1.0956  0.6646  -1.0489 
  (1.45)  (0.91)  (1.41) (0.89) (0.48)  (1.36)  (0.88)  (0.48)  (0.83) 
High -1.1874*  -1.0653  -1.2333*  -1.0149  0.7616  -1.1136*  -1.0343  0.5858  -0.8726 
  (2.20)  (0.89)  (2.32) (0.85) (0.57)  (2.21)  (0.86)  (0.44)  (0.72) 
Some College  -1.1804*  -0.0471  -1.2989*  -0.0194  1.1233  -1.0629*  -0.0191  0.8167  0.1550 
  (2.11)  (0.04)  (2.35) (0.02) (0.83)  (2.02)  (0.02)  (0.61)  (0.13) 
College -1.8052**  -0.5906  -2.2181**  -0.8688  1.0472  -2.0177**  -1.0141  0.5955  -0.7119 
  (3.17)  (0.48)  (4.00) (0.71) (0.77)  (3.81)  (0.83)  (0.44)  (0.58) 
Occ_Years 0.0267*  0.0226  0.0257* 0.0234  0.0333 0.0281 0.0184 0.0378  0.0278 
  (2.06)  (0.77)  (1.97) (0.81) (1.04)  (1.80)  (0.64)  (1.19)  (0.97) 
Age 0.2157**  0.1258  0.2197**  0.1203  -0.1940  0.2269**  0.1274  -0.1924  0.1176 
  (4.16)  (1.26)  (4.22) (1.20) (1.46)  (4.32)  (1.29)  (1.46)  (1.18) 
Age Squared  -0.0023**  -0.0016  -0.0024**  -0.0015  0.0008  -0.0024**  -0.0015  0.0007  -0.0015 
  (5.49)  (1.87)  (5.60) (1.82) (0.73)  (5.72)  (1.87)  (0.69)  (1.83) 
Married -1.2365**  -1.0868*  -1.2659**  -1.0302*  -0.6370  -0.9297*  -0.8003  -0.4810  -0.9368 
  (3.15)  (2.11)  (3.23) (2.00) (1.26)  (2.44)  (1.57)  (0.96)  (1.83) 
Widowed  -0.2816  -0.0672  -0.2477 0.0277 -0.7658  0.0631 0.2644  -0.6082  0.0294 
  (0.55)  (0.08)  (0.49) (0.03) (0.99)  (0.13)  (0.30)  (0.79)  (0.03) 
Divorced  -0.8901*  -1.2490*  -0.8512*  -1.1465* -1.0243 -0.5370 -0.9541 -0.8199  -1.0460 
  (2.06)  (2.22)  (1.98) (2.05) (1.91)  (1.30)  (1.73)  (1.54)  (1.89) 
Employed -0.3634  -0.0280  -0.3912  -0.0376  0.0096  -0.3483  -0.0020  0.0517  -0.0098 
  (1.63)  (0.08)  (1.76) (0.11) (0.03)  (1.61)  (0.01)  (0.18)  (0.03) 
Mother Educ    -0.0712    -0.0672  -0.0508    -0.0490  -0.0639  -0.0512 
   (0.75)    (0.70)  (0.64)    (0.51)  (0.81)  (0.54) 
Father Educ    -0.3207**    -0.3393**  -0.0632    -0.3722**  -0.0757  -0.3439** 
   (4.14)    (4.39)  (1.00)    (4.77)  (1.20)  (4.46) 
Parents Poor    0.0797    0.0478  -0.2086    0.0067  -0.1830  0.0011 45 
 
   (0.27)    (0.16)  (0.87)    (0.02)  (0.77)  (0.00) 











(1.20)   
























BMI 86          0.8484**      0.8502**   
         (20.43)      (20.96)   
Constant  23.1582**  28.3747**  24.0258** 29.3696** 14.5504**  23.0936**  28.9447**  14.6891**  28.6530** 
 (15.81)  (9.97)  (16.53)  (10.35)  (4.14)  (16.05)  (10.26)  (4.20)  (10.17) 
Observations  5635  2531  5635 2531 1885  5963  2590  1921  2554 
R-squared 0.08  0.10  0.07 0.10 0.51  0.07  0.10  0.50  0.10 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.00001  0.02735  0.00006 0.00707 0.01473  0.00003  0.24380  0.17341  0.00015 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. Column 9 
uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 surveys, which 
use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 
includes individuals who are least risk-averse or most risk-tolerant. 
 




Impact of First Occupation on Obesity, 1999 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





 Limited  Extended  Limited  Extended  Extended 
+ ’86 
Obese 




Blue Collar      0.0341**  0.0434*  0.0611*  0.0372**  -0.0005  -0.0326  0.0668** 
      (2.64)  (2.13) (2.49) (3.14) (0.03) (1.38) (3.35) 
Craft  0.0735**  0.1096**          
  (2.69)  (2.64)          
Operative  0.1104**  0.0998*          
  (4.35)  (2.47)          
Transport  0.1117**  0.1567*          
  (2.58)  (2.01)          
Labor  0.0706*  0.0876          
  (2.45)  (1.96)          
Farmer  0.1013**  0.0394          
  (2.69)  (0.61)          
Manager  0.0118  0.0458          
  (0.32)  (0.83)          
Sales 0.0369  0.0474          
  (1.29)  (1.13)          
Clerical  0.0433  0.0429          
  (1.94)  (1.23)          
Service  0.0933**  0.0804*          
  (3.96)  (2.19)          
Private  0.1498**  0.1472          
  (2.60)  (1.53)          
Male  0.0195  0.0029 0.0147  0.0044 -0.0180 0.0204 0.0184 0.0063 -0.0021 
  (1.51)  (0.14) (1.21)  (0.22) (0.74) (1.88) (1.00) (0.29) (0.11) 
Black  0.1262**  0.1284** 0.1352**  0.1343** 0.1014** 0.1335** 0.1339** 0.1023** 0.1323** 
  (9.53) (5.26) (10.27)  (5.52)  (3.36) (10.31) (5.58)  (3.43)  (5.43) 
Hispanic 0.1751*  0.1324  0.1762*  0.1297  0.0266  0.1368*  0.1272  0.0093  0.1286 
  (2.48)  (1.17) (2.49)  (1.17) (0.21) (2.08) (1.15) (0.08) (1.16) 
Other  -0.0910   -0.0944     -0.1049      
 (0.98)    (1.02)      (1.17)       
Some High  -0.0612*  -0.0646  -0.0628*  -0.0600  -0.0219  -0.0629*  -0.0604  -0.0190  -0.0566 
  (2.39)  (1.06) (2.47)  (0.99) (0.29) (2.53) (1.00) (0.25) (0.92) 
High -0.0738**  -0.0628  -0.0820**  -0.0606  -0.0362  -0.0815**  -0.0684  -0.0550  -0.0541 
  (2.93)  (1.03) (3.32)  (1.01) (0.50) (3.34) (1.13) (0.77) (0.89) 
Some College  -0.0530*  0.0021  -0.0664**  0.0030  0.0349  -0.0585*  -0.0073  0.0021  0.0117 
  (2.01)  (0.03) (2.59)  (0.05) (0.46) (2.27) (0.12) (0.03) (0.18) 
College -0.0910**  -0.0279  -0.1188**  -0.0439  0.0427  -0.1135**  -0.0636  -0.0043  -0.0351 
  (3.36)  (0.43) (4.71)  (0.70) (0.55) (4.45) (1.02) (0.06) (0.55) 
Occ_Years  0.0021*  -0.0019  0.0020* -0.0019 0.0005 0.0014 -0.0024 0.0001 -0.0015 
  (2.38)  (0.88) (2.25)  (0.88) (0.17) (1.35) (1.15) (0.05) (0.72) 
Age 0.0096**  0.0090  0.0099**  0.0089  -0.0083  0.0104**  0.0092  -0.0072  0.0080 
  (3.07)  (1.37) (3.16)  (1.36) (0.81) (3.28) (1.42) (0.71) (1.22) 
Age Squared  -0.0001**  -0.0001  -0.0001**  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001**  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001 
  (3.85)  (1.03) (3.93)  (1.05) (0.77) (3.98) (1.09) (0.67) (0.95) 
Married  -0.0889**  -0.0876**  -0.0907** -0.0868** -0.0917* -0.0774**  -0.0720** -0.0768* -0.0768** 
  (4.34)  (3.18) (4.43)  (3.16) (2.36) (3.84) (2.65) (1.98) (2.81) 
Widowed  -0.0265  -0.0410 -0.0225 -0.0301  -0.1156*  -0.0078 0.0002 -0.0948 -0.0200 
  (0.90)  (0.79) (0.76)  (0.57) (2.24) (0.26) (0.00) (1.77) (0.38) 
Divorced -0.0486*  -0.0799**  -0.0469*  -0.0766**  -0.1129**  -0.0392  -0.0690*  -0.1035**  -0.0714* 
  (2.31)  (2.84) (2.22)  (2.73) (3.06) (1.86) (2.46) (2.77) (2.53) 
Employed -0.0361*  0.0171  -0.0360*  0.0149 0.0100  -0.0367**  0.0104  0.0128  0.0102 
  (2.55)  (0.63) (2.54)  (0.55) (0.29) (2.63) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Mother Educ    -0.0092    -0.0098  -0.0154    -0.0087  -0.0160  -0.0080 
   (1.28)    (1.35)  (1.79)    (1.22)  (1.87)  (1.11) 
Father Educ    -0.0161**    -0.0170**  -0.0118    -0.0188**  -0.0143*  -0.0178** 
   (2.63)    (2.78)  (1.64)    (3.09)  (1.99)  (2.91) 47 
 
Parents Poor    -0.0024    -0.0029  -0.0076    -0.0025  -0.0055  -0.0063 
   (0.12)    (0.15)  (0.32)    (0.13)  (0.23)  (0.32) 











(2.76)        











(1.81)        











(3.51)        
Obese  86         0.6646**    0.6635**  
         (16.98)    (17.19)  
Observations  6315  2673 6315  2673 1980 6583 2728 2016 2691 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.00090  0.30195 0.00833  0.03283 0.01286 0.00171 0.97861 0.16701 0.00081 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. 
Column 9 uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 
surveys, which use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 




Impact of First Occupation on Obesity, 2005 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





 Limited  Extended  Limited  Extended  Extended  + 
’86 Obese 
Limited Extended  Extended  + 
’86 Obese 
Extended 
Blue Collar      0.0682**  0.0671**  0.0913**  0.0477**  0.0133  0.0017  0.0939** 
     (4.57)  (2.91)  (3.15)  (3.52)  (0.62)  (0.06)  (4.13) 
Craft  0.1111** 0.1673**               
  (3.55) (3.62)               
Operative  0.1633** 0.1471**               
  (5.64) (3.24)               
Transport  0.1686** 0.2244**               
  (3.28) (2.63)               
Labor  0.1334** 0.1330**               
  (4.01) (2.62)               
Farmer  0.1199** 0.1570*               
 (2.73)  (2.09)               
Manager 0.0094  0.0402              
 (0.23)  (0.65)               
Sales 0.0786*  0.0832            
 (2.41)  (1.72)               
Clerical 0.0719**  0.1136**               
 (2.89)  (2.87)               
Service 0.0949**  0.1019*               
 (3.55)  (2.47)               
Private 0.1309  0.0525               
 (1.89)  (0.51)               
Male  -0.0075 -0.0292  -0.0152  -0.0334 -0.0925** 0.0034  -0.0127 -0.0582* -0.0384 
 (0.52)  (1.23)  (1.11)  (1.49)  (3.27)  (0.28)  (0.62)  (2.30)  (1.79) 
Black 0.1250**  0.1194**  0.1322**  0.1238**  0.1040**  0.1308**  0.1279**  0.1101**  0.1210** 
 (8.05)  (4.35)  (8.59)  (4.53)  (3.05)  (8.81)  (4.75)  (3.26)  (4.44) 
Hispanic  0.1163 0.0459  0.1186  0.0468  -0.0105 0.1056 0.0567 -0.0152 0.0455 
 (1.61)  (0.38)  (1.65)  (0.38)  (0.08)  (1.57)  (0.46)  (0.11)  (0.37) 
Other -0.1478    -0.1525      -0.1642       
 (1.48)    (1.54)      (1.70)       
Some High  -0.0353  -0.0196  -0.0335  -0.0119  0.0256  -0.0321  -0.0179  0.0170  -0.0041 
 (1.01)  (0.24)  (0.96)  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.96)  (0.22)  (0.16)  (0.05) 
High -0.0606  -0.0377  -0.0628  -0.0269  0.0077  -0.0598  -0.0325  -0.0060  -0.0133 
 (1.80)  (0.48)  (1.88)  (0.34)  (0.07)  (1.85)  (0.41)  (0.06)  (0.17) 
Some College  -0.0459  0.0342  -0.0531  0.0434  0.0740  -0.0460  0.0294  0.0462  0.0606 
 (1.31)  (0.42)  (1.54)  (0.53)  (0.68)  (1.36)  (0.36)  (0.43)  (0.73) 
College -0.0952**  -0.0161  -0.1225**  -0.0361  0.0680  -0.1184**  -0.0575  0.0290  -0.0187 
 (2.66)  (0.20)  (3.58)  (0.45)  (0.62)  (3.50)  (0.71)  (0.27)  (0.23) 
Occ_Years 0.0018  -0.0010  0.0018  -0.0008  -0.0003  0.0012  -0.0006  0.0006  -0.0005 
 (1.66)  (0.40)  (1.62)  (0.33)  (0.10)  (0.96)  (0.25)  (0.16)  (0.19) 
Age 0.0110*  0.0078  0.0113**  0.0071  -0.0012  0.0121**  0.0074  -0.0026  0.0068 
 (2.56)  (0.90)  (2.63)  (0.82)  (0.08)  (2.83)  (0.87)  (0.18)  (0.80) 
Age Squared  -0.0001**  -0.0001  -0.0001**  -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0001**  -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0001 
 (3.80)  (1.18)  (3.89)  (1.12)  (0.31)  (3.95)  (1.17)  (0.25)  (1.12) 
Married -0.0472  -0.0141  -0.0498*  -0.0124  0.0070  -0.0314  0.0009  0.0255  -0.0051 
 (1.89)  (0.42)  (2.00)  (0.37)  (0.14)  (1.29)  (0.03)  (0.53)  (0.15) 
Widowed 0.0223  0.0298  0.0237  0.0362  0.0302  0.0370  0.0501  0.0431  0.0366 
 (0.62)  (0.50)  (0.66)  (0.60)  (0.42)  (1.04)  (0.83)  (0.58)  (0.61) 
Divorced -0.0245  -0.0169  -0.0226  -0.0114  -0.0103  -0.0031  0.0029  0.0166  -0.0022 
 (0.92)  (0.46)  (0.85)  (0.31)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.32)  (0.06) 
Employed -0.0373*  -0.0288  -0.0387*  -0.0276  -0.0386  -0.0304*  -0.0255  -0.0335  -0.0279 
 (2.33)  (1.05)  (2.43)  (1.02)  (1.18)  (1.98)  (0.95)  (1.03)  (1.03) 
Mother  Educ  -0.0037    -0.0037  -0.0142   -0.0018  -0.0135  -0.0020 
   (0.45)    (0.46)  (1.45)    (0.22)  (1.38)  (0.25) 
Father Educ    -0.0184**    -0.0202**  -0.0142    -0.0230**  -0.0167*  -0.0212** 
   (2.64)    (2.91)  (1.71)    (3.35)  (2.02)  (3.06) 
Parents  Poor  0.0129    0.0113  -0.0096  0.0093  -0.0082  0.0063 49 
 
   (0.55)    (0.48)  (0.34)    (0.40)  (0.30)  (0.27) 











(1.47)        











(2.06)        











(1.30)        
Obese 86          0.6017**      0.5915**   
         (14.41)      (14.44)   
Observations 5635  2491  5635  2491  1848  5963  2550  1884  2514 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.00001 0.04190  0.00000  0.00366  0.00165  0.00043 0.53615  0.94948  0.00004 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. 
Column 9 uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 
surveys, which use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 





Impact of First Occupation on Alcohol Consumption (Drinks Per Day), 1999 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended Limited Extended Limited Extended  Extended 
Blue Collar      -0.0045  0.0757*  -0.0462*  0.0238  0.0710 
      (0.18) (2.03) (2.03) (0.70) (1.89) 
Craft  0.0387  0.0367       
  (0.89)  (0.61)       
Operative  -0.0003  0.0413       
  (0.01)  (0.68)       
Transport  0.0683  0.0368       
  (0.78)  (0.33)       
Labor  0.0887  0.1509       
  (1.71)  (1.83)       
Farmer  0.0008  0.0230       
  (0.01)  (0.18)       
Manager  0.0104  -0.0253       
  (0.20)  (0.37)       
Sales  0.0655  0.0021       
  (1.57)  (0.03)       
Clerical  0.0040  -0.0526       
  (0.14)  (1.23)       
Service  0.0710  -0.0029       
  (1.95)  (0.05)       
Private  -0.0003  0.1124       
  (0.00)  (0.61)       
Male  0.3106** 0.2792** 0.3281** 0.2909** 0.3330** 0.3117** 0.2978** 
  (13.20) (7.51) (14.57) (8.39) (16.50) (9.46)  (8.71) 
Black  -0.0808** -0.0102 -0.0769** -0.0074 -0.0808** -0.0023  -0.0085 
  (3.15) (0.23) (3.01) (0.17) (3.25) (0.05) (0.20) 
Hispanic  -0.0705 -0.0742 -0.0683 -0.0727 -0.0723 -0.0768 -0.0780 
  (0.79) (0.46) (0.78) (0.46) (0.88) (0.48) (0.49) 
Other  -0.0123 -0.0637 -0.0214 -0.0586 -0.0251 -0.0726 -0.0718 
  (0.12) (0.31) (0.21) (0.29) (0.25) (0.36) (0.35) 
Some  High 0.1532** 0.0579 0.1598** 0.0508 0.1550** 0.0394  0.0484 
  (2.94) (0.37) (3.12) (0.33) (3.17) (0.26) (0.32) 
High  0.1505** 0.0298 0.1517** 0.0149 0.1245** -0.0051  0.0153 
  (3.33) (0.20) (3.47) (0.10) (2.91) (0.04) (0.11) 
Some  College  0.1497** 0.0172 0.1489** 0.0026 0.1217** -0.0188  0.0020 
  (3.08) (0.12) (3.14) (0.02) (2.59) (0.13) (0.01) 
College  0.2093** 0.0114 0.1951** 0.0032 0.1531** -0.0198  0.0017 
  (4.12) (0.08) (4.08) (0.02) (3.19) (0.14) (0.01) 
Occ_Years -0.0004 0.0061 -0.0005 0.0058 -0.0010 0.0064 0.0060 
  (0.30) (1.47) (0.34) (1.37) (0.53) (1.56) (1.43) 
Age  0.0094 -0.0127 0.0095 -0.0122  0.0128*  -0.0110 -0.0118 
  (1.84) (1.05) (1.87) (1.01) (2.35) (0.93) (0.99) 
Age  Squared  -0.0001* 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0001  -0.0001**  0.0001  0.0001 
  (2.13) (0.92) (2.21) (0.89) (2.81) (0.75) (0.85) 
Married  -0.1465** -0.1419** -0.1497** -0.1446** -0.1630**  -0.1252*  -0.1380* 
  (3.56) (2.60) (3.65) (2.64) (4.05) (2.33) (2.54) 
Widowed  -0.0551 -0.1377 -0.0541 -0.1338 -0.0597 -0.1350 -0.1291 
  (0.91) (1.44) (0.90) (1.42) (0.98) (1.48) (1.39) 
Divorced  -0.0370 -0.0763 -0.0387 -0.0798 -0.0540 -0.0666 -0.0742 
  (0.78) (1.28) (0.82) (1.34) (1.16) (1.14) (1.26) 
Employed  0.0392 -0.0301 0.0367 -0.0320 0.0279 -0.0262 -0.0311 
  (1.54) (0.62) (1.45) (0.66) (1.12) (0.54) (0.64) 
Mother  Educ   0.0025  0.0029  0.0012  0.0015 
   (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.10)  (0.12) 
Father  Educ   0.0139  0.0146  0.0144  0.0153 
   (1.16)  (1.23)  (1.26)  (1.30) 
Parents  Poor   -0.0238  -0.0207  -0.0197  -0.0214 
   (0.65)  (0.57)  (0.55)  (0.60) 51 
 
Risk  Averse  2   -0.0544  -0.0544  -0.0568  -0.0605 
   (1.08)  (1.08)  (1.13)  (1.21) 
Risk  Averse  3   -0.0493  -0.0514  -0.0582  -0.0569 
   (0.96)  (0.99)  (1.13)  (1.10) 
Risk  Averse  4   -0.0837*  -0.0852*  -0.0960*  -0.0898* 
   (1.98)  (2.01)  (2.28)  (2.13) 
Constant  0.0860 0.4969 0.1193 0.4876 0.1152 0.4586 0.4593 
  (0.64) (1.60) (0.91) (1.59) (0.88) (1.52) (1.52) 
Observations  6580 2794 6580 2794 6855 2853 2814 
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.08 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.28422 0.40416 0.85344 0.04248 0.04191 0.48589 0.05872 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. Column 7 
uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 surveys, which 
use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 





Impact of First Occupation on Alcohol Consumption (Drinks Per Day), 2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended Limited Extended Limited Extended  Extended 
Blue  Collar      0.0273  0.0048 -0.0376 -0.0076 -0.0240 
      (0.50) (0.06) (0.74) (0.09) (0.26) 
Craft  0.0836  0.0208       
  (0.88)  (0.15)       
Operative  0.0205  -0.0720       
  (0.24)  (0.54)       
Transport  -0.1653  0.1557       
  (1.09)  (0.53)       
Labor  0.3918**  0.3462       
  (3.15)  (1.88)       
Farmer  -0.0077  -0.1098       
  (0.05)  (0.34)       
Manager  0.0510  -0.0589       
  (0.37)  (0.26)       
Sales  0.2118*  0.2067       
  (2.15)  (1.40)       
Clerical  0.0430  -0.0225       
  (0.65)  (0.20)       
Service  0.1010  0.1205       
  (1.30)  (0.95)       
Private  -0.2072  -0.5951**       
  (1.76)  (3.49)       
Male  0.6889** 0.7390** 0.7242** 0.7952** 0.7485** 0.8094** 0.8081** 
  (13.51) (8.50) (14.41) (9.31) (16.40)  (10.14) (9.45) 
Black  -0.3990** -0.3211** -0.4022** -0.3154** -0.3840** -0.2809** -0.3227** 
  (6.95) (3.20) (7.09) (3.11) (6.89) (2.77) (3.20) 
Hispanic  0.1881 0.2263 0.1961 0.2175 0.4095 0.2086 0.2014 
  (0.68) (0.50) (0.71) (0.49) (1.38) (0.47) (0.46) 
Other  -0.1663 -0.6074 -0.1873 -0.6261 -0.2043 -0.6217 -0.6260 
  (0.57) (1.17) (0.64) (1.19) (0.73) (1.17) (1.20) 
Some  High 0.1173 0.0947 0.1420 0.1863 0.1841 0.1715 0.1690 
  (0.90) (0.37) (1.10) (0.73) (1.49) (0.68) (0.66) 
High  0.1116 0.0252 0.1397 0.1117 0.1484 0.0999 0.1054 
  (0.90) (0.11) (1.15) (0.47) (1.25) (0.42) (0.44) 
Some  College  -0.0022 -0.2593 0.0256 -0.1669 0.0013 -0.1897 -0.1842 
  (0.02) (1.08) (0.20) (0.71) (0.01) (0.80) (0.78) 
College  -0.0433 -0.2959 -0.0403 -0.2361 -0.0799 -0.2589 -0.2628 
  (0.33) (1.21) (0.32) (0.99) (0.62) (1.05) (1.08) 
Occ_Years -0.0012 -0.0103 -0.0014 -0.0112 -0.0035 -0.0093 -0.0123 
  (0.40) (1.04) (0.48) (1.11) (0.88) (0.96) (1.24) 
Age  -0.0425** -0.0142 -0.0429** -0.0162  -0.0376*  -0.0180  -0.0144 
  (2.95) (0.40) (2.97) (0.46) (2.53) (0.52) (0.42) 
Age  Squared  0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (1.25) (0.19) (1.23) (0.11) (0.94) (0.08) (0.15) 
Married  -0.3806** -0.3705* -0.3912** -0.3762* -0.4392** -0.3798* -0.4003** 
  (3.49) (2.49) (3.58) (2.52) (3.93) (2.54) (2.65) 
Widowed  -0.0434 -0.0939 -0.0468 -0.0934 -0.0981 -0.1013 -0.1136 
  (0.33) (0.46) (0.36) (0.46) (0.74) (0.49) (0.55) 
Divorced  0.0496 0.0326 0.0450 0.0263 -0.0094 0.0145 0.0012 
  (0.41) (0.20) (0.37) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) (0.01) 
Employed  0.0346 -0.1161 0.0387 -0.0960 0.0640 -0.0661 -0.0877 
  (0.54) (1.07) (0.61) (0.90) (1.04) (0.62) (0.83) 
Mother  Educ   -0.0414  -0.0394  -0.0349  -0.0410 
   (1.52)  (1.44)  (1.29)  (1.52) 
Father  Educ   0.0276  0.0285  0.0295  0.0296 
   (1.11)  (1.15)  (1.22)  (1.21) 
Parents  Poor   -0.1732*  -0.1684*  -0.1757*  -0.1698* 
   (2.14)  (2.10)  (2.23)  (2.13) 53 
 
Risk  Averse  2   -0.0648  -0.0684  -0.0786  -0.0694 
   (0.51)  (0.54)  (0.63)  (0.55) 
Risk  Averse  3   -0.2275  -0.2246  -0.2397  -0.2235 
   (1.82)  (1.79)  (1.95)  (1.80) 
Risk  Averse  4   -0.1913  -0.1906  -0.1889  -0.1795 
   (1.79)  (1.78)  (1.79)  (1.69) 
Constant  2.8164** 2.4499* 2.8863**  2.4291**  2.8076** 2.3986* 2.4239** 
  (6.30) (2.57) (6.51) (2.58) (6.37) (2.57) (2.61) 
Observations  5872 2598 5872 2598 6212 2658 2621 
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.11 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.00691 0.00250 0.61369 0.95520 0.45946 0.92893 0.79336 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. Column 7 
uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 surveys, which 
use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 




Impact of First Occupation on Smoking, 1999 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended Limited Extended Limited Extended  Extended 
Blue Collar      0.0150  0.0251  0.0317**  0.0357*  0.0052 
      (1.28) (1.33) (2.88) (2.00) (0.29) 
Craft  0.0383  0.0601       
  (1.57)  (1.59)       
Operative  0.0421  0.0572       
  (1.81)  (1.51)       
Transport  0.0524  0.1022       
  (1.38)  (1.53)       
Labor  0.0552*  0.0730       
  (2.11)  (1.75)       
Farmer  0.0185  0.0860       
  (0.55)  (1.35)       
Manager  -0.0245  -0.0403       
  (0.72)  (0.79)       
Sales  0.0338  0.0342       
  (1.23)  (0.80)       
Clerical  0.0338  0.0620       
  (1.53)  (1.79)       
Service  0.0379  0.0462       
  (1.69)  (1.30)       
Private  -0.0022  0.0459       
  (0.04)  (0.51)       
Male  0.0765** 0.0647** 0.0749** 0.0601** 0.0728** 0.0656** 0.0692** 
  (6.40) (3.18) (6.69) (3.15) (7.36) (3.77) (3.83) 
Black  -0.0152 -0.0354 -0.0134 -0.0336 -0.0192 -0.0265 -0.0341 
  (1.24) (1.60) (1.10) (1.52) (1.61) (1.21) (1.54) 
Hispanic  -0.0744 -0.0550 -0.0735 -0.0558 -0.0692 -0.0574 -0.0580 
  (1.58) (0.56) (1.56) (0.57) (1.48) (0.60) (0.60) 
Other  -0.1533*  -0.1538*  -0.1581*    
  (2.01)  (2.02)  (2.13)    
Some  High 0.0408 0.0800 0.0461 0.0835 0.0313 0.0763 0.0792 
  (1.42) (1.23) (1.60) (1.28) (1.14) (1.19) (1.23) 
High  -0.0812** -0.0916 -0.0771** -0.0874 -0.0867** -0.0845  -0.0921 
  (3.15) (1.66) (3.01) (1.58) (3.49) (1.53) (1.67) 
Some  College  -0.1185** -0.1218* -0.1165** -0.1199* -0.1228** -0.1189*  -0.1252* 
  (4.79) (2.32) (4.74) (2.28) (5.12) (2.27) (2.41) 
College  -0.1869** -0.2077** -0.1919** -0.2168** -0.1934** -0.2103** -0.2208** 
  (7.71) (4.11) (8.20) (4.37) (8.36) (4.23) (4.49) 
Occ_Years -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0010 
  (0.32) (0.50) (0.32) (0.48) (0.92) (0.28) (0.53) 
Age  0.0196** 0.0195** 0.0197** 0.0192** 0.0198** 0.0187** 0.0194** 
  (5.56) (2.89) (5.60) (2.85) (5.71) (2.80) (2.90) 
Age  Squared -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
  (7.01) (3.57) (7.07) (3.52) (7.19) (3.46) (3.57) 
Married  -0.1045** -0.0851** -0.1063** -0.0861** -0.1150** -0.0889** -0.0861** 
  (5.29) (3.12) (5.38) (3.17) (5.94) (3.33) (3.19) 
Widowed  -0.0216 -0.0164 -0.0232 -0.0171 -0.0382 -0.0378 -0.0186 
  (0.71) (0.30) (0.77) (0.31) (1.30) (0.72) (0.34) 
Divorced  0.0231 0.0414 0.0226 0.0418 0.0149 0.0382 0.0462 
  (1.09) (1.40) (1.08) (1.42) (0.73) (1.32) (1.57) 
Employed  -0.0378** -0.0666* -0.0381** -0.0655* -0.0354** -0.0614*  -0.0640* 
  (2.82) (2.33) (2.84) (2.29) (2.66) (2.16) (2.24) 
Mother  Educ   -0.0048  -0.0049  -0.0037  -0.0056 
   (0.70)  (0.72)  (0.55)  (0.83) 
Father  Educ   0.0010  -0.0001  0.0007  -0.0008 
   (0.17)  (0.02)  (0.12)  (0.14) 55 
 
Parents  Poor   -0.0168  -0.0173  -0.0139  -0.0160 
   (0.87)  (0.90)  (0.73)  (0.84) 
Risk  Averse  2   0.0229  0.0229  0.0217  0.0247 
   (0.83)  (0.83)  (0.79)  (0.89) 
Risk  Averse  3   0.0161  0.0182  0.0135  0.0163 
   (0.57)  (0.65)  (0.49)  (0.59) 
Risk Averse 4    0.0416    0.0428*    0.0372  0.0409 
   (1.92)  (1.97)  (1.73)  (1.89) 
Observations  6573 2762 6573 2762 6847 2824 2785 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.52375 0.61747 0.19934 0.18416 0.00400 0.04531 0.77501 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. 
Column 7 uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 
surveys, which use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 




Impact of First Occupation on Smoking, 2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended Limited Extended Limited Extended  Extended 
Blue  Collar      0.0062 -0.0024 0.0193 0.0084 -0.0262 
      (0.53) (0.13) (1.77) (0.48) (1.51) 
Craft  0.0068  0.0021       
  (0.29)  (0.06)       
Operative  0.0083  -0.0161       
  (0.37)  (0.47)       
Transport  0.0233  0.1020       
  (0.62)  (1.55)       
Labor  0.0298  0.0220       
  (1.17)  (0.58)       
Farmer  0.0080  0.0927       
  (0.24)  (1.48)       
Manager  0.0032  -0.0124       
  (0.10)  (0.25)       
Sales  -0.0015  -0.0090       
  (0.06)  (0.24)       
Clerical  0.0019  0.0154       
  (0.09)  (0.48)       
Service  0.0175  0.0191       
  (0.81)  (0.58)       
Private  -0.0362  0.0229       
  (0.75)  (0.29)       
Male  0.0620** 0.0475* 0.0650**  0.0529**  0.0693**  0.0521**  0.0607** 
  (5.26) (2.46) (5.82) (2.90) (7.00) (3.09) (3.48) 
Black  -0.0155 -0.0442* -0.0148 -0.0432* -0.0184 -0.0442*  -0.0466* 
  (1.27) (2.06) (1.23) (2.02) (1.56) (2.12) (2.19) 
Hispanic  -0.0746 -0.0835 -0.0734 -0.0799  -0.0857*  -0.0825 -0.0805 
  (1.74) (1.09) (1.70) (0.98) (2.03) (1.01) (0.99) 
Some  High 0.0189 0.0238 0.0213 0.0319 0.0231 0.0301 0.0270 
  (0.65) (0.37) (0.74) (0.49) (0.83) (0.47) (0.42) 
High  -0.0797** -0.0977 -0.0789** -0.0922 -0.0737** -0.0922  -0.0986 
  (3.01) (1.70) (3.02) (1.61) (2.88) (1.61) (1.72) 
Some  College  -0.1123** -0.1228* -0.1122** -0.1183* -0.1099** -0.1192*  -0.1272* 
  (4.45) (2.30) (4.51) (2.21) (4.47) (2.22) (2.40) 
College  -0.1686** -0.1862** -0.1704** -0.1877** -0.1684** -0.1860** -0.1985** 
  (6.80) (3.57) (7.10) (3.64) (7.10) (3.60) (3.89) 
Occ_Years -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0004 
  (0.49) (0.10) (0.47) (0.09) (0.75) (0.10) (0.21) 
Age  0.0182** 0.0167* 0.0181** 0.0160* 0.0181** 0.0149*  0.0166* 
  (4.66) (2.31) (4.64) (2.23) (4.76) (2.09) (2.32) 
Age  Squared -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
  (6.18) (3.22) (6.18) (3.13) (6.34) (3.03) (3.21) 
Married  -0.1053** -0.0904** -0.1072** -0.0909** -0.1211** -0.0891** -0.0925** 
  (5.15) (3.15) (5.24) (3.18) (6.08) (3.14) (3.24) 
Widowed  0.0063 -0.0129 0.0052 -0.0133 -0.0115 -0.0120 -0.0123 
  (0.22) (0.28) (0.18) (0.29) (0.41) (0.26) (0.26) 
Divorced  0.0049 0.0277 0.0042 0.0282 -0.0039 0.0283 0.0268 
  (0.24) (0.94) (0.20) (0.96) (0.20) (0.97) (0.92) 
Employed  -0.0278* -0.0523* -0.0274* -0.0511* -0.0301* -0.0448* -0.0487* 
  (2.15) (2.29) (2.12) (2.24) (2.39) (1.99) (2.15) 
Mother  Educ  -0.0183**  -0.0178**  -0.0175**  -0.0186** 
   (2.76)  (2.69)  (2.68)  (2.80) 
Father  Educ   0.0057  0.0049  0.0060  0.0047 
   (0.99)  (0.86)  (1.06)  (0.83) 
Parents  Poor   -0.0050  -0.0061  -0.0027  -0.0049 
   (0.26)  (0.32)  (0.14)  (0.26) 
Risk  Averse  2   0.0288  0.0270  0.0243  0.0250 
   (1.09)  (1.02)  (0.93)  (0.95) 57 
 
Risk  Averse  3   0.0126  0.0117  0.0090  0.0101 
   (0.48)  (0.45)  (0.35)  (0.39) 
Risk  Averse  4   0.0189  0.0207  0.0183  0.0198 
   (0.93)  (1.01)  (0.91)  (0.98) 
Observations  5841 2567 5841 2567 6180 2627 2590 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.95340 0.67305 0.59429 0.89280 0.07692 0.62849 0.13173 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. 
Column 7 uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 
surveys, which use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 




Impact of First Occupation on Physical Activity (frequency of light/vigorous), 1999 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended Limited Extended Limited Extended  Extended 
Blue  Collar      1.2917* 0.8384 1.4910*  1.1768* 1.0556 
      (2.17) (1.48) (2.30) (2.29) (1.80) 
Craft  2.4834  0.2361       
  (1.32)  (0.29)       
Operative  0.3401  0.2129       
  (0.42)  (0.20)       
Transport  0.8045  2.5454       
  (0.70)  (1.20)       
Labor  1.4411  1.4544       
  (1.83)  (1.30)       
Farmer  2.9176*  3.5134       
  (2.13)  (1.93)       
Manager  1.1764  0.5871       
  (1.31)  (0.51)       
Sales  -0.1623  -0.2539       
  (0.22)  (0.27)       
Clerical  -0.3694  -0.4761       
  (0.72)  (0.65)       
Service  0.3053  0.0208       
  (0.55)  (0.03)       
Private  2.7320  3.0636       
  (1.05)  (0.87)       
Male  0.5349 -0.0155 0.8696 0.1603 0.9705 0.1676 0.0670 
  (1.09) (0.03) (1.46) (0.29) (1.66) (0.32) (0.13) 
Black  -0.5006 0.3504 -0.5288 0.4144 -0.4496 0.5726 0.6573 
  (1.03) (0.50) (1.00) (0.57) (0.78) (0.78) (0.87) 
Hispanic  -0.6962 -1.6022 -0.8711 -1.3432 -0.7093 -1.3993 -1.2688 
  (0.66) (1.18) (0.74) (0.92) (0.58) (0.94) (0.88) 
Other  -2.2045** 0.4750 -2.3461** 0.5463  -1.9621*  0.6584  0.5252 
  (2.61) (0.32) (2.75) (0.36) (2.11) (0.45) (0.34) 
Some  High 0.3384 -1.0817 0.0549 -1.3233 0.5669 -1.5496 -1.1867 
  (0.18) (0.38) (0.03) (0.47) (0.31) (0.56) (0.43) 
High  0.2105 -2.1947 -0.1051 -2.5771 0.5842 -2.4142 -2.4102 
  (0.11) (0.81) (0.05) (0.99) (0.30) (0.92) (0.93) 
Some  College  -1.5023 -3.5603 -1.7760 -3.9078 -0.8549 -3.3128 -3.4283 
  (0.82) (1.30) (0.91) (1.48) (0.46) (1.25) (1.30) 
College  -1.5493 -3.5877 -1.8273 -3.8969 -0.9929 -3.4258 -3.5460 
  (0.84) (1.29) (0.93) (1.47) (0.54) (1.29) (1.34) 
Occ_Years -0.0580 -0.0866 -0.0583 -0.0863 -0.1014 -0.0936 -0.0850 
  (0.94) (1.04) (0.89) (1.04) (1.24) (1.16) (1.04) 
Age  0.2044 0.2168 0.2007 0.2044 0.2405 0.2263 0.2206 
  (0.96) (0.93) (0.93) (0.88) (1.06) (1.00) (0.97) 
Age  Squared  -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0017 
  (0.79) (0.77) (0.76) (0.71) (0.77) (0.79) (0.80) 
Married  -1.7438* -1.2417 -1.6795* -1.2210  -1.2515  -1.0720  -1.0829 
  (2.53) (1.54) (2.46) (1.52) (1.90) (1.32) (1.33) 
Widowed  -3.1753*  -1.2097 -2.9498 -1.0067  -2.9253*  -1.2892 -0.8762 
  (2.06) (0.60) (1.94) (0.49) (1.97) (0.64) (0.42) 
Divorced  -1.2200 -0.7503 -1.1458 -0.7589 -0.8949 -0.6690 -0.7364 
  (1.49) (0.80) (1.43) (0.81) (1.19) (0.73) (0.80) 
Employed  -2.5994* -1.7767* -2.6040* -1.7944*  -2.2774  -1.7340* -1.7635* 
  (2.03) (2.22) (2.01) (2.21) (1.86) (2.18) (2.18) 
Mother  Educ   0.1909  0.1998  0.1791  0.1552 
   (0.83)  (0.88)  (0.80)  (0.69) 
Father  Educ   -0.0459  -0.0441  -0.0542  -0.0418 
   (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.34)  (0.26) 
Parents  Poor   0.0317  0.0214  -0.0308  -0.1173 
   (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.18) 59 
 
Riskdummy2   -1.7384*  -1.7434*   -1.7277**  -1.7895** 
   (2.54)  (2.57)  (2.60)  (2.67) 
Riskdummy3   -0.6711  -0.7323  -0.8567  -0.8000 
   (1.00)  (1.10)  (1.31)  (1.20) 
Riskdummy4   -0.1189  -0.0843  -0.0512  -0.0535 
   (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Constant  8.7729 9.4987 9.0475 9.9578 6.8060 9.0206 9.2728 
  (1.94) (1.68) (1.90) (1.79) (1.37) (1.62) (1.67) 
Observations  3543 1722 3543 1722 3705 1761 1738 
R-squared 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.05674 0.42823 0.03020 0.13889 0.02175 0.02187 0.07149 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. Column 7 
uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 surveys, which 
use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 
includes individuals who are least risk-averse or most risk-tolerant. 
 




Impact of First Occupation on Physical Activity (frequency of light/vigorous), 2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   
First Occupation Based on Recall 
 
 





  Limited Extended Limited Extended Limited Extended  Extended 
Blue  Collar      -0.1763 0.8241 -0.0945 0.2732 0.5822 
      (0.17) (0.55) (0.12) (0.29) (0.72) 
Craft  -1.5988  -1.7635       
  (1.35)  (0.99)       
Operative  -1.7221  -0.6476       
  (1.69)  (0.44)       
Transport  -2.9583*  -3.9303       
  (2.14)  (1.21)       
Labor  1.5054  4.0395       
  (0.91)  (1.48)       
Farmer  2.9019  4.5617       
  (1.34)  (1.58)       
Manager  -0.8926  -0.1305       
  (1.00)  (0.11)       
Sales  1.3768  4.1563       
  (0.42)  (0.78)       
Clerical  -1.1202  -1.3791       
  (1.48)  (1.32)       
Service  -1.0078  -2.0316       
  (1.20)  (1.61)       
Private  0.4916  -0.3619       
  (0.25)  (0.13)       
Male  1.7845  1.6432 2.1015* 2.0418  1.9096**  2.2257* 2.2056 
  (1.80) (1.03) (2.04) (1.25) (2.72) (2.00) (1.85) 
Black  1.2904 4.9821 1.1650 5.0157 1.0269 4.7855 4.8595 
  (0.79) (1.08) (0.72) (1.05) (0.69) (1.03) (1.03) 
Hispanic  -1.5870 -2.7300 -1.3344 -2.1715 -1.1631 -2.2820 -2.3505 
  (1.57) (1.15) (1.33) (0.97) (1.25) (0.99) (1.02) 
Other  -1.9440* -1.3767 -1.9584* -1.8497  -1.9980**  -1.9952  -1.9377 
  (2.15) (0.50) (2.39) (0.62) (2.61) (0.72) (0.70) 
Some  High 2.7443 -0.2167 2.2127 0.3209 1.8867 0.1931 0.1940 
  (1.80) (0.09) (1.49) (0.14) (1.23) (0.08) (0.08) 
High  2.0602 0.8221 1.4919 1.1891 1.0581 1.1222 1.0766 
  (1.63) (0.35) (1.17) (0.50) (0.82) (0.48) (0.45) 
Some  College  2.2569 0.4206 1.7541 0.7840 1.2483 0.6134 0.6716 
  (1.26) (0.18) (0.95) (0.31) (0.66) (0.24) (0.26) 
College  0.9755 -2.0557 0.8097 -1.1213 0.5174 -1.3236 -1.3147 
  (0.79) (0.69) (0.65) (0.41) (0.40) (0.51) (0.51) 
Occ_Years 0.0719 0.0086 0.0812 0.0289  0.0967*  -0.0074  -0.0123 
  (1.54) (0.11) (1.67) (0.39) (2.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
Age  -0.3872 -1.2499 -0.4095 -1.2967 -0.4914 -1.1808 -1.1704 
  (1.31) (1.26) (1.35) (1.25) (1.55) (1.14) (1.15) 
Age  Squared  0.0039 0.0140 0.0040 0.0143 0.0046 0.0135 0.0134 
  (1.32) (1.25) (1.34) (1.24) (1.48) (1.16) (1.17) 
Married  0.7440 1.7746 0.6379 1.5607 0.6419 1.6629 1.5325 
  (0.84) (1.10) (0.75) (1.05) (0.86) (1.17) (1.08) 
Widowed  -1.0020 -4.3037 -1.0367 -4.5251 -0.9502 -4.4429 -4.4810 
  (0.68) (1.14) (0.70) (1.17) (0.61) (1.15) (1.13) 
Divorced  0.8730 0.1252 0.7078 -0.3022 0.6556 -0.1637 -0.2478 
  (0.92) (0.14) (0.75) (0.35) (0.77) (0.19) (0.28) 
Employed  -1.8045 -2.6625 -1.8327 -2.7912 -1.7027 -2.7766 -2.7760 
  (1.84) (1.28) (1.80) (1.27) (1.80) (1.29) (1.24) 
Mother  Educ   -0.6121  -0.5267  -0.4982  -0.4927 
   (1.51)  (1.34)  (1.26)  (1.24) 
Father  Educ   1.0089  1.0388  1.0484  1.0624 
   (1.03)  (1.01)  (1.02)  (1.03) 
Parents  Poor   -1.2951  -1.3461  -1.0909  -1.1376 
   (1.01)  (1.05)  (0.84)  (0.88) 61 
 
Riskdummy2   -0.9244  -0.7181  -0.6119  -0.6742 
   (0.94)  (0.72)  (0.63)  (0.68) 
Riskdummy3   -0.3776  -0.4922  -0.4664  -0.4643 
   (0.39)  (0.56)  (0.52)  (0.52) 
Riskdummy4   1.2233  1.2726  1.3631  1.3869 
   (1.06)  (1.06)  (1.17)  (1.18) 
Constant  15.3545** 32.6283 15.8567** 32.1561 18.4081** 29.5804  29.1670 
  (2.83) (1.81) (2.79) (1.71) (3.04) (1.61) (1.61) 
Observations  3040 1513 3040 1513 3184 1548 1528 
R-squared 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.08 
Firstocc p-
value 
0.05747 0.28242 0.86724 0.58499 0.90089 0.77142 0.47300 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS models are reported, with robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. Column 7 
uses a definition of blue collar that includes responses on first occupation from 2003 and 2005 surveys, which 
use the 2000 Census of Population; blue collar categories used are: cleaning/maintenance; 
farming/fishing/forestry; construction; extraction; install/maintenance/repair; production; and transportation. 
Risk Averse Category 4 represents individuals who are classified as the most risk-averse; the reference group 
includes individuals who are least risk-averse or most risk-tolerant. Table 7a 
Constrained Bivariate Probit Estimates 






















1 Probit  (ρ=0) 0.0339*  0.0147  0.0590**  0.0384* 
    (2.17) (0.97) (3.27) (2.21) 
2  ρ=0.1 -0.012837  -0.0304* 0.5970  -0.0149 
    (0.84) (2.02) (0.22) (0.86) 
3  ρ=0.2  -0.0585** -0.0756** -0.0501** -0.0681** 
    (3.89) (5.08) (2.87) (3.99) 
4  ρ=0.3  -0.1036** -0.1213** -0.1033** -0.1213** 
    (7.06) (8.24) (6.09) (7.23) 
5  ρ=0.4 -0.1486  -0.1680**  -0.1557**  -0.1748** 
    (10.41)  (11.59) (9.48) (10.66) 
6  ρ=0.5 -0.1940  -0.2162**  -0.2076**  -0.2285** 
    (14.03) (15.20) (13.16) (14.35) 
7  ρ=-0.1  0.0821*** 0.0603*** 0.1150*** 0.0919*** 
    (5.17) (3.95) (6.31) (5.28) 
8  ρ=-0.2  0.1321*** 0.1067*** 0.1720*** 0.1457*** 
    (8.22) (6.98) (9.40) (8.39) 
9  ρ=-0.3  0.1842*** 0.1545*** 0.2297*** 0.1999*** 
    (11.37) (10.10) (12.61) (11.62) 
10  ρ=-0.4  0.2385*** 0.2039*** 0.2881*** 0.2546*** 
    (14.71) (13.37) (16.00) (15.01) 
11  ρ=-0.5  0.2953*** 0.2555*** 0.3468*** 0.3096*** 
    (18.31) (16.87) (19.67) (18.66) 
12  Sel on obs=  -0.0403***  -0.3101***  -0.0071  -0.0671*** 








Observations  4596 4454 4137 4052 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported.  Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value<0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; 
* 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. 
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Table 7b 
Constrained Bivariate Probit Estimates 






















1 Probit  (ρ=0)  0.0119 0.0293* 0.0088 0.0226* 
    (1.04) (2.52) (0.77) (1.98) 
2  ρ=0.1  -0.0324** -0.0152 -0.0304** -0.0174 
    (2.90) (1.32) (2.80) (1.58) 
3  ρ=0.2  -0.0754** -0.0597** -0.0680** -0.0567** 
    (6.91) (5.22) (6.44) (5.21) 
4  ρ=0.3  -0.1175** -0.1046** -0.1050** -0.0966** 
   (11.08)  (9.27)  (10.21)  (8.97) 
5  ρ=0.4  -0.1591** -0.1503** -0.1419** -0.1378** 
    (15.49) (13.56) (14.19) (12.94) 
6  ρ=0.5  -0.2008** -0.1973** -0.1794** -0.1807** 
    (20.24) (18.20) (18.48) (17.24) 
7  ρ=-0.1  0.0581*** 0.0744*** 0.0495*** 0.0621*** 
    (4.97) (6.34) (4.33) (5.54) 
8  ρ=-0.2  0.1065*** 0.1203*** 0.0930*** 0.1034*** 
   (8.95)  (10.23)  (7.94)  (9.16) 
9  ρ=-0.3  0.1573*** 0.1675*** 0.1396*** 0.1465*** 
    (13.06) (14.23) (11.66) (12.89) 
10  ρ=-0.4  0.2106*** 0.2161*** 0.1896*** 0.1919*** 
    (17.37) (18.43) (15.57) (16.82) 
11  ρ=-0.5  0.2666*** 0.2664*** 0.2432*** 0.2399*** 
    (22.01) (22.92) (19.77) (21.04) 
12  Sel on obs=  -0.1655*** 
[ρ>1] 
0.3847*** 




Observations  6602 6448 5897 5848 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported.  Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value<0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; 
* 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1. Table 8 























Blue  Collar 4.690 3.624 3.507 7.730 
  (4.329) (4.834) (4.000) (7.403) 
Observations  2507 2554 2399 2452 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.1155 0.0572 0.1024 0.1195 




Blue  Collar 0.308 0.211 0.386 0.722 
  (0.348) (0.391) (0.345) (0.646) 
Observations  2507 2554 2399 2452 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.2789 0.1442 0.3439 0.3848 




Blue Collar  -1.471**  -2.053*  -2.422*  -3.547 
  (0.712) (1.135) (1.368) (2.646) 
Observations  2586 2636 2463 2517 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.1579 0.4118 0.6211 0.6354 




Blue  Collar 0.058 -0.036 0.360 0.631 
  (0.334) (0.416) (0.321) (0.552) 
Observations  2585 2635 2461 2515 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.2991 0.1882 0.7588 0.9025 




Blue Collar  -9.216  -11.993  13.275  20.116 
 (6.031)  (9.805)  (46.597)  (54.880) 
Observations  1596 1628 1449 1480 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.9763 0.6909 0.2321 0.2564 
F  statistic 5.90 2.84 0.29 0.22 
Notes: Extended models are employed.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value<0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; 
* 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1.  Excluded instruments pertain to county unemployment (1968) and 



























Blue Collar  0.156  1.481**  1.247*  1.851** 
 (0.679)  (0.749)  (0.753)  (0.876) 
Observations 2720  2777  2536  2596 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.6858 0.9457 0.9843 0.9400 




Blue Collar  0.013  0.087  0.064  0.113 
 (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.071) 
Observations 2720  2777  2536  2596 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.7824 0.5592 0.8717 0.8180 




Blue Collar  0.219**  0.128  0.207  -0.495* 
 (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.249)  (0.268) 
Observations 2803  2863  2603  2664 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.5351 0.2723 0.0773 0.2518 




Blue Collar  0.035  -0.034  0.027  -0.042 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.058) 
Observations 2801  2861  2600  2661 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.6697 0.4607 0.3944 0.1538 




Blue Collar  0.589  0.542  5.149*  6.768** 
 (1.326)  (0.867)  (3.010)  (3.217) 
Observations 1728  1767  1517  1553 
Overidentification 
p-value  0.5047 0.7278 0.0289 0.9244 
F statistic  16.12  49.75  16.88  13.02 
Notes: Extended models are employed.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value<0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; 




Stratified Samples  
Controlling for Current Occupation, 1999 
 
   BMI Obese  Alcohol  Smoking  Physical 
Activity 





























































Stratified Samples  
Controlling for Current Occupation, 2005 
 
   BMI Obese  Alcohol  Smoking  Physical 
Activity 

































































Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression model and shows coefficients on blue collar (based on 
recall).  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Extended models are employed.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1.   















































































Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression model.  Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. All models control for the variables in the limited models in Tables 2-6 in addition to state 
fixed effects.  Asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: *** p-value≤ 0.01; ** 0.01<p-value≤ 
0.05; * 0.05<p-value≤ 0.1.   Sample sizes range from 2043 to 6599. 
 
 
 
 
 